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THE PROBLEM WITH SULLIVAN
INTRODUCTION
With the fiftieth anniversary of the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan' decision approaching, there will surely be much praise for what
is largely regarded as one of the greatest First Amendment cases in U.S.
history. And while I agree with the outcome of the case and support
broad First Amendment protections in general, I think, in retrospect, that
Sullivan poses a bit of a problem.
The Court's decision was hailed as a breakthrough for First
Amendment rights because it acknowledged that there should be
constitutional protection for false statements in some circumstances and
that the value of expression may outweigh the value of avoiding potential
harm to reputation. But the Court's opinion was based on what we might
call a "falsity model" of First Amendment theory-the notion that false
speech is problematic precisely because it is false.2 This same rationale
was the basis for the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalized
false statements concerning military service, and other laws that seek to
curtail or punish speech that is false on its face.4
* Associate General Counsel for NPR, specializing in First Amendment issues,
particularly libel and privacy matters, and adjunct professor at American University.
I would like to thank Lawrence Solum, Lee Levine, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Len
Niehoff, Bruce Brown, John Watson, Rory Eastburg, Noah Hampson, Michael
Brody, and Matthew Schafer for their comments, suggestions and encouragement. I
would also like to thank Professor Mitch Green both for his insightful and helpful
comments on this paper, as well as for his own writing, without which this article
would not have been possible.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. To be fair, the Court's opinion in Sullivan condemns only those statements
that are known to be false. In fact, the Court notes, "[e]ven a false statement may be
deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error."' Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1947); and citing JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 561 (Yale 1959)).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
4. The Stolen Valor Act was deemed unconstitutional as a violation of the First
Amendment. U.S. v. Alvarez, _ U.S. , , 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2556 (2012).
Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion supports several of the arguments made herein,
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There are legitimate concerns about false speech, particularly
where it rises to the level of being fraudulent. Nevertheless, I would
argue that Sullivan is based on a faulty premise; namely, that all
knowingly false factual assertions are devoid of constitutional value-a
notion further reinforced by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Cases have
since demonstrated that there are problems with this premise, and, in
libel cases, the courts have wrestled with ways to protect valuable yet
false statements. In a few cases, courts have regrettably imposed liability
on publishers who repeat the highly newsworthy statements, resulting in
the "Sullivan gap"-an absence of an effective defense in cases where
there should be a recognition of "constitutional value" in the false
statements. These typically involve cases where a report that is likely to
be false or known to be false is nevertheless highly expressive or
newsworthy and should be reported, not to demonstrate the truth of the
assertion, but to show the mindset or conduct of the speaker or the
existence of a controversy. For example, news organizations have
quoted citizens alleging that "President Obama is a Muslim," because the
statement truthfully reflects the mindset of certain segments of society,
which is having an impact on American political culture and is therefore
important to report, even if the reporter knows that the proposition itself
6
is false. Under the traditional republication rule, the reporter and news
organization would be liable for repeating the statement, and Sullivan's
actual malice defense provides no protection, as the potential defendants
know the statement is false.' This is an example of the gap in
constitutional protection due to the limits of the Sullivan rule.
particularly the notion that falsity alone-even a knowing falsity- should not be the
determinative factor when First Amendment interests are present. See id. at 2539-41.
5. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[T]here is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact."). There is an interesting conflict between this assertion in Gertz
and the spirit of Sullivan's footnote 19. See supra note 2.
6. The degree to which Americans have adopted this false belief has been well-
documented. See Jon Cohen & Michael D. Shear, Poll: 1 in 5 thinks Obama is a
Muslim, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010 at Al, A4.
7. It is fair to ask whether the statement would be actionable, as calling
someone a Muslim is not necessarily "defamatory," which is a required element of a
libel claim. However, in the context in which it is often used, the allegation tends to
imply some defamatory element, i.e., that President Obama is being dishonest about
his religious views, or that he secretly harbors ill will towards the United States.
Thus, it is arguable that the statement could be deemed defamatory. Of course, it is
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Given the limitations inherent in the "falsity model," the Sullivan
rule does not always protect statements that have expressive value, and
thus, courts have applied a variety of other defenses to protect speech. I
will examine some of these defenses, such as the neutral reportage
privilege, the fair report privilege, and the opinion privilege, and I argue
that there is a common trait among these other defenses: they reflect an
acknowledgment that the statements at issue are not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.9 Instead, the statements are designed to
point at some larger truth in the world or serve some other legitimate,
valuable, expressive purpose. It would make sense, therefore, to rethink
the basis for constitutional protection for speech in libel cases so that
these valuable types of expression can receive constitutional protection.
The analysis shows that the problems stem in part from a lack of
clear legal terminology for the various ways that people use words to
convey information or ideas. However, the field of philosophy of
language has developed a rich vocabulary for and extensive analysis of
the way people use words. In this Article, I borrow terms from "speech
act" theory, a subfield of philosophy of language, to illustrate and
attempt to solve some of the problems in libel law. Lawyers and judges
have struggled with many of these concepts over the last few decades, so
the concepts are familiar. Adopting speech act terminology for the
purpose of this Article provides more precise words to clarify what
highly unlikely President Obama will sue over such statements, and so the media's
real "defense" is simply his lack of will to pursue a claim.
8. For the purposes of this article, when I refer to statements with "expressive
value," I am referring to statements whose primary purpose is something other than
attempting to persuade the audience of the truth of the proposition contained therein.
As explained throughout this paper, there are a variety of applicable alternate
purposes, such as faithfully reporting what another person has said, expressing belief
or state of mind, demonstrating the existence of a controversy, or otherwise
conveying information that has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the
proposition contained within the statement.
9. If this phrasing sounds familiar, it should. The hearsay rule makes a similar
distinction between statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted and statements that are offered for some other purpose, such as to prove
motive, belief, state of mind, or a variety of other purposes that are not dependent
upon the truth or falsity of the propositional content of the statement. See FED. R.
EVID. 801 & 803. I have intentionally adopted the phrasing used in hearsay cases
because the concept should be familiar to lawyers and judges, and I am making an
analogous distinction.
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courts have intuitively known and better define where the lines should be
drawn for constitutional protection of speech.
The concept of a "speech act" was introduced by philosopher
John L. Austin in the book How to Do Things With Words.'0 The idea is
that people can perform acts with words; for example, a "promise" is a
specific type of speech act wherein a person commits himself to a future
act by saying words that indicate a promise. There are several kinds of
speech acts, which will be described and discussed in more detail below,
and I will argue that "libeling" is a specific kind of speech that is
parasitic on the act of "telling," which should be distinguished from other
speech acts (such as questioning, concluding, reporting, or speculating)
that deserve constitutional protection because of their expressive value.
Such a model would reflect the protection that courts have extended to
speech by distinguishing between those statements where knowingly
false factual assertions are made in an effort to "prove" the truth of the
matter asserted, as opposed to those statements that serve some other
legitimate, expressive purpose.
Part I of this Article discusses the Sullivan case, its logic, and its
reasoning. Part II explains why Sullivan is problematic because of the
gap it creates in protection for certain valuable statements. Part III
analyzes ways the courts have attempted to grapple with the "Sullivan
gap" and defenses that have been created to protect valuable, expressive
speech. Part III also argues that what these defenses all have in common
is that they protect statements that are not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. Part IV applies philosophical principles-the
notions of propositions and speech acts-to explain why modern libel
law is based on tenuous assumptions and confusing definitions.II Part IV
also urges the adoption of "speech act" terminology to clarify the issues
facing courts in libel cases. An incredibly complicated structure of libel
law has developed because of the lack of adequate terminology to
10. See generally J.L. AUsTIN, in How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O.
Urmson ed. 1965).
11. 1 am not the first person to suggest that speech act theory can be applied to
understand the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of
Communicative Action, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54 (1988-89) (arguing that Jilrgen
Habermas' theory of communicative action, derived from speech act theory, can
serve as the basis for interpreting the First Amendment). Solum cites other scholars
that have taken similar approaches. Id. at 106 n.201.
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distinguish what kinds of speech should be protected from those that
should not. Applying precise terms alleviates much of the confusion that
has arisen over the last few decades. Part V addresses some concerns
with providing greater immunity in libel cases. Part VI proposes a
"speech act model," allowing for liability only where there is a "telling,"
to eliminate the "Sullivan gap" and provide a consistent constitutional
standard to protect valuable, expressive speech, yet preserve libel as a
cause of action in the cases where it is truly appropriate. The benefit of
such a rule would be to greatly simplify libel doctrine.
I. THE SULLIVAN OPINION
The facts of Sullivan are well-known: Sullivan was an elected
official in Montgomery, Alabama, who oversaw the city's police
department.12 A political advertisement ran in the New York Times that
criticized the conduct of the police officers who treated civil rights
demonstrators badly. 13 Sullivan sued for libel, arguing that it defamed
him in his role overseeing police conduct.14 The Court ruled that elected
officials such as Sullivan cannot prevail in a libel action unless they can
prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice," defined as
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."' 5
The Court correctly noted that First Amendment values should
take precedence over the common law contours of libel.16 It relied on
12. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
13. Id.
14. Id at 256-57.
15. Id at 280.
16. The Court said:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
"libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law . ...
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach
of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the
various other formulae for the repression of expression that
have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
Id at 269 (citations omitted).
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four different justifications to conclude that the First Amendment
required protection of the speech at issue. All four justifications are still
important considerations in First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, the Court noted that freedom of expression "was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."17  In other words,
free expression is an important component of participation in society.
Second, the Court endorsed what has come to be known as the
"marketplace of ideas" theory; that is, the notion that truth is most likely
to be discovered when ideas compete.' 8 Third, the Court invoked Justice
Louis Brandeis to reiterate that censorship does not change minds or
promote truth; it merely destabilizes and delegitimizes authority.19
Finally, the Court did not place much importance on the quality of
speech, demonstrating a willingness to protect distasteful expressions.20
In taking up the topics of truth and falsity, the Court provided a
lengthy discourse expressing two related ideas. First, that constitutional
protection for speech should not turn solely on truth, in large part
21
because errors are inevitable. Second, that defamatory content should
not always be actionable because criticizing official conduct is an
17. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
18. Id. at 270 ("The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, 'presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all."' (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
19. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)).
20. Id. at 269 ("'[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions."' (quoting
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941))). "Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials." Id. at 270.
21. The Court emphasized in multiple places the notion that errors are
inevitable. See id. at 271-72. Such a stance was important because, under the law at
the time, even the slightest deviation from the truth could subject a publisher to
liability.
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important part of the democratic process, and criticism inherently
22involves speech that would injure reputation.
The Court also noted the chilling effect that fear of civil liability
would have on publishers if they were forced to prove truth, because
even when one believes a statement to be true, it can be difficult, if not
impossible, to prove truth in court.23 And thus, the Court adopted the
"actual malice" rule: Officials may not recover damages for libel unless
they can prove that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted
24with reckless disregard for the truth.
Acknowledging that falsity should be an important component in
a libel case was somewhat revolutionary. Libel law originally was
concerned with defamatory statements, meaning statements that tended
to lower one's esteem in the community. There was no requirement that
25
the statement be false. In fact, the plaintiffs burden of proving falsity
was not officially instituted until 1986, in Philadelphia Newspapers v.
Hepps, which followed Sullivan's falsity model. Thus, historically, one
could be liable for calling someone a murderer or philanderer, even if the
statement were true. Of course, the defendant may have been able to
escape liability if he could prove the statement was true, but it was often
27
difficult to prove such things absent a criminal conviction. The
22. Id at 272-73. The Court later noted James Madison's view that free
discussion of the stewardship of public officials was a fundamental principle of the
American form of government. Id. at 275.
23. Id at 278-79.
24. Id. at 280.
25. This was true of the Alabama libel law under which Sullivan brought his
claim:
Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a publication is
"libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person . . . in his
reputation" or to "bring him into public contempt"; the trial
court stated that the standard was met if the words are such as
to "injure him in his public office, or impute misconduct to
him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of
fidelity to a public trust . . . ."
Id at 267. See also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS, § 2:1.1 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that at common law, falsity was
presumed and the plaintiff was not obligated to prove it).
26. 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
27. The Court specifically noted this notorious difficulty in Sullivan. See
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
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emphasis in libel cases was on the damage to the plaintiffs reputation,
28not on the truth or falsity of the statement. What the Sullivan Court
(and later Court opinions) got right is the idea that truth and falsity does
matter; what it missed, however, is how it matters.
To sum up the Sullivan Court's reasoning, there are two related
principles that are relevant to my discussion: (1) a person's reputational
interest must yield to the First Amendment when genuine First
Amendment interests are present, and (2) errors are to be expected, but
dissemination of a known falsity (or of a probable falsity) is
unacceptable.
I will return to principle (1) in this Article's conclusion, but first
I will focus on principle (2). The problem with Sullivan is that principle
(2) is a somewhat flawed premise. In First Amendment cases, the
question should be whether there is a legitimate expressive purpose that
should be protected. In most cases, it is probably true that there would
be no legitimate expressive purpose in knowingly disseminating a false
factual assertion. But, as this Article will show, that principle applies
only in instances where the speaker is disseminating the false statement
with the purpose of "proving" the truth of the matter asserted on the basis
of his assertion. As history has shown, there are other purposes for
disseminating false statements, but the failure to distinguish these
expressive purposes has caused some strange outcomes and convoluted
reasoning in subsequent cases and has done a disservice to the notion of
truth. A related problem is that lower courts have accepted the logic of
Sullivan as the only constitutional analysis required, in turn leading to
problematic results.29
II. THE PROBLEM WITH SULLIVAN
The problem with New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan and its
progeny is the assumption that an expression of knowing falsity is
always harmful. That premise has manifested itself in two problematic
ways. First, it fails to acknowledge the occasions when knowing falsity
28. Even to this day, it is possible under Massachusetts law to be liable for
libel even in cases where the statement is 100% indisputably true. See Noonan v.
Staples, 556 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2009).
29. See for example, the discussion of Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa.
2004), infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
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is not necessarily a problem but is perhaps even a benefit. Second, and
possibly more importantly, it fails to distinguish between the truth or
30)
falsity of a proposition and truth or falsity in the world. In many cases,
both problems are present. In this section, I will focus on the first part of
the problem: the failure to distinguish a harmful knowing falsity from a
useful knowing falsity.
The Supreme Court has famously stated, "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact." 31 This statement from
Gertz perhaps contradicts the statement from Sullivan that "constitutional
protection does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the
ideas and beliefs which are offered."' 32 Of course, one might distinguish
between the truth of "facts," which are presumably provable as true or
false, and the truth of "ideas and beliefs," which are presumably
opinions, not subject to proof. I will argue later in this Article that the
distinction is not quite so clear-cut as to justify constitutional doctrine.
At this point, however, I argue that there are nevertheless
occasions when false statements-even knowing false statements-are,
in fact, useful and should be afforded constitutional protection. There
are occasions when repeating a knowing or probable falsity does promote
First Amendment values: such a statement may help inform the public
about the conduct of public officials and, ironically, promote truth. It is
therefore important to distinguish a harmful knowing falsity from a
useful knowing falsity.
A harmful knowing falsity is one that does not further any
interest in communication, understanding, public participation, truth, or
expression. It is essentially fraud. The alleged facts in the criminal libel
case Ivey v. Alabama33 provide an example of a falsity claim. Garfield
Ivey was accused of paying a former prostitute to claim, knowing that it
was false, that Steve Windom (a candidate for lieutenant governor) was
30. The reliance in traditional libel law on the propositional content of a
statement is highly problematic because propositions are "communicatively inert."
Nevertheless, the traditional "republication rule" presupposes that the propositional
content of a statement can form the basis for liability. See the detailed discussion of
propositions and speech acts, infra Part IV.
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
32. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (citation omitted).
33. 821 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 2001).
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her client and had physically abused her. 3 If the alleged facts were true,
Ivey's speech (through his paid representative, the prostitute), was a
knowing falsity that served only his own interests (harming the candidate
he opposed) and created a specific, identifiable harm to listeners (who
were given false information, thereby hindering their ability to choose
wisely in the election) as well as to the subject (whose reputation was
tarnished, at least temporarily, until the prostitute recanted). The claims
of abuse could have been deemed a fraud upon the public. Most
importantly, Ivey intended that the assertion be accepted as true based on
the claim-i.e., the statement was offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted-and there was no other expressive purpose behind the
statement. In such cases, the First Amendment need not protect the
speech.
A useful knowing falsity is one that does serve some interest in
communication, understanding, public participation, truth or expression;
its primary purpose is not to prove the truth of the matter asserted.16 In
some cases, the language will be offensive, crude, or poorly constructed,
but the interest in expression or information nevertheless validates the
speech.
34. Id. at 939. I make no claim as to whether the allegations were true or false.
Ivey's conviction was overturned on appeal on the technicality that the Alabama
criminal libel statute did not require proof of actual malice. Id The court specifically
stated that its opinion "cannot and should not be viewed as vindication of Ivey's
version of the evidence." Id.
35. Some harmful knowing falsities may nevertheless be protected under the
First Amendment. See, e.g., U.S. v. Alvarez, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
The question is not simply whether the speech is true or false, or even whether there
is some "harm" that can be identified. There must be some other component, such as
rising to the level of fraud, in order to prosecute an offender without running afoul of
First Amendment principles. This Article does not provide a comprehensive look at
what might qualify as "something extra" to justify prosecution, or what "harms" are
remediable; it is focused on the narrow topic of what should be required when the
alleged harm is damage to reputation.
36. It is possible that the speaker will subjectively believe the statement to be
true and, in a derivative sense, assert its truth. This is particularly true in the case of
opinion; but the expression of truth is secondary to the expression of belief. It is also
possible in the case of reportage, where a reporter might subjectively be inclined to
believe one version of events over another, but his primary goal is to faithfully and
fairly report both sides of a dispute. In either case, the expressive purpose is primary
and should be understood by the audience. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
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The most obvious example of a useful knowing falsity is a joke.
Jokes often require as their premise a knowing falsity, but they
nevertheless express some idea, and they do not defraud the listener.
Satire, sarcasm and hyperbole are other methods of communication that
rely on this same principle.37
This issue arose, albeit indirectly, in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell.3 1 In that case, Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine for libel
over an ad parody that mocked Falwell.3 9 Included as part of the joke
was the assertion that his first sexual encounter was with his own mother
in an outhouse.40 At trial, the jury found the Hustler ad parody could not
"reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or
actual events in which [he] participated." 4 1 Because the depiction was
not found to be a "factual assertion" about Falwell, the Court was not
required to deal with the fact that Hustler knew the statement was false
42
and actual malice could otherwise have been proved. Nevertheless, this
37. The Supreme Court has granted First Amendment protection to these types
of expression. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Assoc. of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (applying First Amendment protection to statement that
non-union members of a bargaining unit were "scabs" and "traitors"); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (overturning libel verdict based on
statement at city council meeting that plaintiffs negotiating strategy was
"blackmail").
38. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
39. Id.at46.
40. Id. "Th[e] parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included
interviews with various celebrities about their 'first times,' referring to the first time
they sampled Campari, but playing on the sexual double entendre of the term 'first
time."' Id. at 48. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the
disclaimer, "ad parody-not to be taken seriously." Id.
41. Id. at 57.
42. As a general principle, libel claims must be based on "factual assertions,"
meaning that the statement can be understood as stating actual facts and is
susceptible of being proved true or false. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S.
1, 21 (1990). On its face, the statement that Falwell had sex with his mother in an
outhouse would appear to be a factual assertion insofar as it is capable of being
proved true or false. It either happened or it did not. It is not a value judgment, nor is
there any use of a vague, poorly defined term. Yet, it is deemed not to be a "factual
assertion," presumably because of the context in which it appears, an ad parody. The
danger, however, would arise when a jury or court did not "get" the joke and
interpreted such a statement to be a factual assertion. See, e.g., New Times, Inc. v.
Isaaks, 146 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. 2004). In New Times, Inc., the lower Texas courts held
that an article's satirical nature was not necessarily obvious to a reader, and that the
2012]1 183
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case illustrates the principle that the actual malice standard might be
inadequate to the extent that some knowingly false statements may have
legitimate expressive value.
Ironically, the Hustler Court reiterated the dictum from Gertz:
"False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with
the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause
damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by
counterspeech, however persuasive or effective."4 3 Yet the Hustler case
involved a knowing falsity, because that is what a joke is-it is inherent
in the medium-and yet we do find value in humorous expression. The
Hustler Court specifically noted the value of caricature in commenting
on public figures, despite also noting that caricature, by definition,
involves deliberate distortion, i.e., a knowing falsity.44 It is somewhat
disingenuous to explain away the difference between a joke and any
other knowing falsity simply by claiming that in the case of a joke, no
one would believe it. It is also true that no one would believe speakers
who lack credibility in other contexts, and yet liability is imposed.4 5
When considered carefully, it becomes clear that there are many kinds of
statements where the statement cannot "reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts,"46 even if the syntax of the statement appears to
be in the form of an assertion. In such cases, the context shows that the
speaker lacks the knowledge required to convey facts, or is not
attempting to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
paper published the "false statements of fact" that formed the basis of the satire with
actual malice, because they knew the statements were, literally, false. Id. at 157.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Texas eventually ruled that the Dallas Observer's
satirical article was protected by the First Amendment, finding that the lower courts
underestimated the reasonable reader. Id. at 157-61.
43. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
340, 344 n.9 (1974)).
44. Id. at 53-54.
45. For an example of a case where no one believed the statement at issue and
yet the plaintiff prevailed in a libel claim, see Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa.
2004). The Norton court noted that even a private figure plaintiff is required to show
actual injury resulting from the defamatory statements. Norton, 860 A.2d at 55-56
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340). Yet it is not clear that any actual injury occurred in
the sense that anyone would have believed the statements to be true which would
have harmed plaintiff's reputation. For a discussion of the importance of credibility
and its relationship to actual injury, see infra note 123 and Parts IV.C., IV.D.
46. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57.
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Cases invoking the neutral reportage privilege are also often
based on a useful knowing falsity. Although some courts have extended
protection for neutral reportage, most have not.47 The most egregious
example of a court's failure to protect a useful knowing falsity was in
48
Norton v. Glenn. The facts of Norton are bizarre: a local newspaper
published an article that detailed heated exchanges that occurred among
members of the local town council.49  One councilman, William T.
Glenn, Sr. ("Glenn"), made outrageous statements about Council
President James B. Norton III ("Norton") and Mayor Alan M. Wolfe
("Wolfe").o Glenn had claimed that Norton and Wolfe were
homosexuals; that Glenn had observed Norton involved in a homosexual
act; that Norton and Wolfe were "queers and child molesters;" and that
Norton had made homosexual advances toward Glenn. Glenn had
declared that he had a duty to make the public aware of this information
as Norton and Wolfe had "access to children."51 The newspaper also
published Norton's response to the charges: "If Mr. Glenn has made
comments as bizarre as that, then I feel very sad for him, and I hope he
can get the help he needs."52
The court considered whether the article should be protected by
53
the First Amendment pursuant to the neutral reportage privilege. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted the privilege in Edwards v.
54
National Audubon Society, Inc., finding that the First Amendment
55
mandated that protection. The Norton court undertook its own
examination as to whether that privilege was truly mandated under the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Norton court examined Sullivan5 6 as well as other
subsequent cases. It noted that the Court has never veered from the
47. See infra Part 1Il.A.
48. 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004).
49. Id at 49-50.
50. Id at 50.
51. Id.
52. Id at 49-50.
53. See id. at 54; see also infra Part 1I.A (discussing the neutral reportage
privilege more thoroughly).
54. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977).
55. See id at ll5.
56. Norton, 860 A.2d at 54-55 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964)).
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actual malice standard as the vanguard for First Amendment protection,
and thus saw no reason to expand protection to cover neutral reportage as
applied to the present facts . While the court acknowledged the
"visceral appeal" of applying the neutral reportage privilege to the facts
of the case, it felt that its role was not to "champion what [it] perceive[d]
to be good public policy."59 Because the U.S. Supreme Court had always
57. See id. at 55-56 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)).
58. Specifically, the court said:
Accordingly, we conclude that the existing case law from the
U.S. Supreme Court indicates that the high Court would not so
sharply tilt the balance against the protection of reputation, and
in favor of protecting the media, so as to jettison the actual
malice standard in favor of the neutral reportage doctrine.
Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a burden (albeit a
minimal one) on the media to refrain from publishing reports
that they know to be false or that they published with reckless
disregard of whether it was false. In light of the high Court's
consistent application of the actual malice standard in these
types of cases, and its cautions that free expression law should
be balanced against, and not be allowed to obliterate, state law
protections to reputation, we cannot logically conclude that the
high Court would abandon the actual malice standard.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Media Defendants'
argument can be characterized as a plea for us to effectuate
important public policy goals by charting a new course with
regard to federal constitutional law, one apart from that set by
the U.S. Supreme Court, we resoundingly reject it. This is not
to say that the Media Defendants' position regarding the
provision of newsworthy information to the body politic does
not have some visceral appeal. Yet, our role in these matters is
not to champion what we perceive to be good public policy.
Rather, our function, as a state supreme court examining a
federal constitutional question on which the U.S. Supreme
Court has not yet spoken, is to attempt to anticipate how the
federal high Court would dispose of this issue. As detailed
supra, our examination leads us to the conclusion that the U.S.
Supreme Court will not adopt the neutral reportage doctrine.
Norton, 860 A.2d at 57.
59. Id.
applied the Sullivan actual malice standard, the Pennsylvania Supreme
60
Court, too, would apply Sullivan as the constitutional safeguard.
Thus, Norton demonstrates the limits of Sullivan's actual malice
standard.61 In Norton, there was a useful probable falsity, and the court
acknowledged the communicative value of the statement. Despite its
falsity, the statement had expressive value that should have been
constitutionally protected. A concurring opinion in Norton noted that the
lack of constitutional protection for cases such as this, where a known
falsity was nevertheless useful, was highly problematic:
I am concerned also with the practical difficulties
the press will encounter in trying to walk the very
fine line between accurately reporting public
governance-related comments such as these, while
avoiding liability for doing so. Absent a privilege,
the newspaper may be forced to sanitize the report
or resort to vagaries-highly subjective changes
which inevitably will operate to mislead the public
60. See id.
61. For a similarly egregious case, see Little v. Consolidated Publ'g Co., No.
CV-09-900147, 2010 WL 4910858 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 3, 2010), reh'g granted, 83
So.3d 517 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Little also involved an allegedly defamatory
statement made by one city councilman against another. The court rejected the
notion that the paper should be protected because it truthfully reported what
transpired at the city council meeting and applied the actual malice standard.
Unfortunately, the court's interpretation of actual malice was improperly broad. The
evidence showed that the reporter did not know the statement was false.
Nevertheless, the court initially found that the paper acted with actual malice
because it knew that the councilmen disliked each other and it knew that the subject
had denied the allegation. This is a completely unreasonable standard, as many
politicians dislike each other and subjects of allegations generally deny them,
regardless of their veracity. Holding reporters liable under such circumstances would
eviscerate the protection intended by Sullivan for statements concerning public
officials. Fortunately, on rehearing, the court reconsidered its interpretation of
"actual malice" and found that the plaintiff had not proven that the paper acted with
actual malice. Little, 83 So.3d at 524. But more relevant to the discussion herein, the
statements should also be protected because, regardless of the truth of the allegation,
the fact that one city councilman is lodging the accusation against the other is
important in itself and thus has value that should be constitutionally recognized. The
reporting of the councilman's allegation was not to prove the truth of the assertion
but to inform the community about the councilman's mindset and behavior,
regardless of the assertion's truth.
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as to the seriousness or rashness of the accusations.
Moreover, by forcing newspapers to recharacterize
what actually occurred, the absence of a privilege
essentially requires the substitution of editorial
opinion for accurate transcription. Such a
transformation of the actual event inevitably alters
its context and content. In addition to being
inaccurate, news reports altered for fear of
litigation would be of far lesser value to the general
public in learning of and passing upon the
appropriateness of the public behavior of their
elected officials. Such a stilted reporting regime
would contravene the United States Supreme
Court's seminal statement that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and... may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials." 62
The reporting of Glenn's statements served an important purpose that
would typically be protected by the First Amendment: it conveyed
information about the behavior and judgment of a public official. While
the proposition was superficially about Norton, the statement did not
practically convey information about Norton; rather it conveyed
information about Glenn. Reporting his statements helped the public
understand what transpired at the city council meeting, and also
conveyed useful information about Glenn's mindset and behavior.
Surely, voters would want to know what kind of councilman Glenn is,
and his outrageous outburst informs the public as to his own behavior.
Although the statements were most likely false, reporting them conveyed
important information aside from the truth or falsity of the proposition.
Now that brings us to the second manifestation of the flaw in
Sullivan: that the courts have failed to distinguish the truth of a
proposition from the broader truth of the state of affairs in the world.63
62. Norton, 860 A.2d at 60 (Castille, J., concurring) (quoting N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
63. This problem has been recognized by others who have called for some
additional constitutional privilege. See Jonathan Donnellan & Justin Peacock, Truth
& Consequences: First Amendment Protection for Accurate Reporting on
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In Norton, the proposition was false, but the statement nevertheless
reflected a larger truth about what transpired at the city council meeting
and about a city councilman's mindset and behavior. Courts have
struggled with addressing this flaw in a variety of ways.
III. WAYS COURTS HAVE USED LIBEL DEFENSES TO COVER THE "GAP"
Given the foregoing, it should be apparent that there is a
"Sullivan gap:" instances where speakers may know a proposition is
false, thus losing protection under the actual malice standard, even
though there is a legitimate expressive interest in conveying the
statement. 4 Not all cases that might fall into the gap go unprotected,
however. Courts have developed a rich body of law that seems to stem
intuitively from the appeal of protecting speech that is potentially (or
even likely to be) false because they nevertheless recognize the
expressive value of the communication, even if the proposition reflects
negatively on the subject of the speech. As discussed below, courts have
taken various approaches to this issue. Each approach has its limits.
Moreover, each approach has something in common with the others,
even if the courts have not explicitly recognized the similarity. In all of
Government Investigations, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 237, 268 (2005) (arguing for a
"First Amendment-based limit on the republication doctrine when the press is
providing accurate reports on government accusations and investigations"); Matthew
J. Donnelly, Note, A Newsworthiness Privilege for Republished Defamation of
Public Figures, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2009) (arguing for a newsworthiness
privilege for media defendants). I agree with the Donnellan & Peacock analysis in
particular, but think that the underlying problem is much broader than the reporting
problems they address. I would prefer a more fundamental approach that protects a
broader range of speech based on the same theory that, in real life, truth is broader
than the propositional content of any statement. Also, the test I propose is not
dependent on the status of the defendant as a "media defendant," as courts have
generally been reluctant to provide greater protection to the press than is granted to
the general public.
64. For another analysis of how the "substantive promise" of Sullivan is
unfulfilled, see C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory
Meaning, and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78
IOWA L. REV. 237, 318-23 (1993) (arguing that Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), illustrates the failure of the actual malice
standard to adequately reach all forms of communication that may deserve
protection).
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the cases, the protected statements are not offered as proof of the matter
asserted. They are made for some expressive purpose other than proving
the truth of the statement. This commonality may justify a new approach
to constitutional protection in libel cases.
A. Neutral Reportage Privilege
The neutral reportage defense was established by the Second
65
Circuit Court of Appeals in Edwards v. National Audubon Society. In
Edwards, the editor of the National Audubon Society's publication,
American Birds, wrote that scientists who advocated the use of DDT
were "paid to lie."66  Specifically, he said, "[a]ny time you hear a
'scientist' say the opposite [of the position that DDT is harmful], you are
in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie, or is parroting
something he knows little about."67 The editor testified that he never
intended to portray anyone in particular as a liar; he "merely expressed
his belief that many supporters of DDT use were spokesmen for the
pesticide industry."6 8 The New York Times published an article about the
controversy and repeated the editor's allegations. The article also named
certain scientists that the editor thought were spokesmen for the pesticide
industry.69 The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiffs were
public figures, but that the Times could be liable under Sullivan's actual
malice test if the writer had serious doubts about the truth of the
allegations, even if he were accurately describing the allegations. The
jury found the paper liable.70
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the First Amendment
required protection of the newspaper:
At stake in this case is a fundamental principle.
Succinctly stated, when a responsible, prominent
organization . . . makes serious charges against a
public figure, the First Amendment protects the
accurate and disinterested reporting of those
65. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977).




70. See id. at 119.
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charges, regardless of the reporter's private views
regarding their validity. What is newsworthy about
such accusations is that they were made. . . . The
public interest in being fully informed about
controversies that often rage around sensitive
issues demands that the press be afforded the
freedom to report such charges without assuming
71
responsibility for them.
Some courts have since adopted this neutral reportage privilege in one
form or another in an effort to make a distinction between false facts
disseminated for the purpose of intentional distortion and false facts
disseminated for some other "useful" purpose, such as to inform the
public about important controversies.7 2 In virtually all of these cases, the
courts recognize that the important fact is that the statement was made,
71. Id. at 120 (emphasis added) (referencing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971); Medina v. Time, Inc., 439 F.2d 1129 (1st Cir. 1971)).
72. The defense has been accepted in numerous cases. See, e.g., Sunshine
Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1499, 1510
(D.S.C. 1989) (stating that a television station that reported allegations of store's
deceptive merchandizing practices and included store's denials is protected by
neutral reportage privilege); In re UPI, 106 B.R. 323, 329-331 (D.D.C. 1989)
(finding the neutral reportage doctrine protected a reporter who neutrally reported
allegations that politician was involved in organized crime; the fact that the accuser
was not prominent or responsible was irrelevant; the key factor is the neutrality of
the report); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(applying neutral reportage privilege to a report of allegations by player that a coach
had behaved improperly; fact that player was not "trustworthy" was irrelevant; the
important factor was that allegations were made by one participant in a controversy
against another participant); Celebrezze v. Netzley, Nos. 53864, 10 WL 87566, at
*9-10 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1988) (upholding summary judgment for newspaper
on the basis of neutral reportage where paper neutrally reported allegations made in
a campaign brochure by Republican official against a Democratic state supreme
court justice), rev'd on other grounds, 554 N.E.2d 1292 (Ohio 1990).
The concept of neutral reportage has also been adopted by the Canadian
Supreme Court as a factor to be considered in the newly established defense of
"responsible communication on a matter of public interest." See Grant v. Torstar,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, _ (Can.) (opining that reportage may be responsible and
protected speech "(1) if the report attributes the statement to a person, preferably
identified, thereby avoiding total unaccountability; (2) the report indicates, expressly
or implicitly, that its truth has not been verified; (3) the report sets out both sides of
the dispute fairly; and (4) the report provides the context in which the statements
were made").
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73
not whether the statement is true. The statements are not repeated as
proof of any assertion, but rather to show that the existence of the
assertion is itself a fact in the world-regardless of whether it is true.
Some of the cases rejecting the neutral reportage privilege
reasoned that the defense was not required because the defendants were
adequately protected by the Sullivan actual malice standard. In such
cases where the plaintiffs were unable to prove that the defendants had
acted with actual malice, there was no compelling reason to adopt the
neutral reportage as an additional defense.7 4 In other cases rejecting the
privilege, it is not clear that the report at issue was of the type envisioned
to be protected by the privilege. The Norton case, however, stands out
as an example of the "Sullivan gap:"7 6 the story is clearly newsworthy;
73. Even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, rejecting the neutral reportage
privilege, acknowledged that these types of reports are important to the public. See
Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48, 59 (Pa. 2004) (Castille, J., concurring) ("'What is
newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made."' (quoting Edwards v.
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977))).
74. See Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1225-29 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting
neutral reportage defense because it was not clear whether it was reconcilable with
Supreme Court precedent, but nevertheless ruling in favor of media defendant
because plaintiff had not demonstrated that defendant had acted with actual malice);
Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 511, 516-19 (Mich. App. 1982)
(rejecting neutral reportage, but nevertheless reversing a libel judgment because the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the defendants acted with actual malice).
75. See, e.g., McCall v. Courier-Journal, 623 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky. 1981). In
McCall, a newspaper reported that an attorney may have violated ethical rules by
offering a client a contingency arrangement in a criminal case and hinting that he
may use improper influence with a judge to affect the outcome of his client's case.
The newspaper relied upon direct quotes from the attorney that had been secretly
recorded and characterized the attorney's actions as potentially unethical. Id at 884-
85. It is not clear to me that this is the kind of case for which the neutral reportage
defense was intended to provide protection, because the paper was not relying
primarily on allegations made by a third party, nor was it attempting to explain a
controversy or demonstrate the state of mind of any speaker. The paper seems to be a
participant in making the allegations. Whether the report was substantially true or
not, and, whether the article should have been protected by the First Amendment for
other reasons, are separate questions.
76. The circumstances of Norton are not as rare as one might think. See Dan
Laidman, When Slander is the Story: The Neutral Reportage Privilege in Theory and
Practice, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 74, 77 (2010) (demonstrating that situations in
which the neutral reportage privilege would be needed are more common than the
case law suggests).
the truth of the statement is irrelevant; the fact that the statement was
made is important for public understanding of government action; and
yet the court rejected the neutral reportage privilege because it had not
yet been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.77
B. Fair Report Privilege
The fair report privilege is another defense that potentially
protects the dissemination of false statements, but it is limited in scope
78
and should be distinguished from the neutral reportage privilege. The
privilege generally protects republication of statements contained in
official government reports or court proceedings, as long as the
republication fairly and accurately describes the report and properly
attributes the source of the statement. The policy behind the privilege is
that even though the statements contained in the report may be false, they
should be protected because the fact that they exist is an important part
of the government record. 79 An alternate rationale is that because the
document is a public record, anyone could read it, and a news
organization should not be punished for publishing what anyone could
77. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
78. The reasoning behind the fair report privilege and the neutral reportage
privilege is similar, but the defenses are different. The primary difference is that fair
report applies only to government records and proceedings, whereas neutral
reportage could apply to other controversies, including to allegations made by
private parties without any official government action. The jurisdictions that have
rejected the neutral reportage doctrine nevertheless accept the fair report privilege,
largely because it is accepted that the government is subject to scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Norton, 860 A.2d at 50. The trial court in Norton had incorrectly ruled that neutral
reportage was the equivalent of the fair report privilege, which protects reports of
official proceedings, and in which the knowledge of falsity is irrelevant. On appeal,
however, a concurring opinion noted that, even if the neutral reportage privilege
were not adopted, the fair report privilege might apply to the facts of this case. Id. at
61-64 (Castille, J. concurring). The question, though, was whether all of the
statements at issue were part of the "official proceeding." Justice Ronald Castille
noted that the trial court should make the determination as to whether the statements
made immediately after the public meeting had ended would fall within the scope of
the privilege. Id. at 63. It is possible that under some states' interpretations of the fair
report privilege, the statements would not be protected. It is also worth noting that
fair report is a common law qualified privilege, and neutral reportage, where
recognized, is a constitutional defense.
79. SACK, supra note 25, § 7:3.2.2.2.
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read.so In either case, the important fact is not whether the allegation is
true or false, but the fact that the allegation was made. In essence, the
courts acknowledge that this is a "useful" dissemination of a potential
falsity because it enhances understanding of a court proceeding or other
government activity.
The fair report privilege does not apply to all allegations. The
privilege is defined by state law, and the scope of the privilege varies by
state. Some states may restrict the privilege to the news media.82 Some
states have applied the privilege to "unofficial" statements,83 whereas
84
other states limit the privilege to "official" statements. Some courts
have applied the privilege to reports by foreign governments, but others
have deemed foreign reports too unreliable to be covered by the
privilege.86 And finally, in some states, the privilege may be overcome if
there is evidence of actual malice;87 thus, the privilege may not be
effective in minimizing the "Sullivan gap." Such discrepancies leave
defendants who publish nationally (a category that includes national
newspapers, magazines, cable news, broadcast networks, and syndicated
radio, as well as everything published online) in a position where they
cannot reliably count on the fair report privilege to protect a particular
80. Id.
81. Id. § 7:3.2.2.1.
82. See, e.g., Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 878 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005) (applying the fair report privilege to the media).
83. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying
privilege to unofficial public statements of a member of Congress).
84. Massachusetts, for example, has distinguished protected official statements
from unprotected, unofficial statements. See Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260, 267
(Mass. 1987). One case held that witness reports to police were not covered by the
privilege if the police did not take official action. See Reilly v. Associated Press, 797
N.E.2d 1204, 1215 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). Such a rule can lead to obvious problems
when the fact that a witness made a statement to police is an important fact in itself,
aside from the truth of the allegation.
85. Friedman v. Israel Labour Party, 957 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Daniel
Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Van de Wetering, 630 N.Y.S.2d 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
86. Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988); Oao Alfa Bank v. Ctr.
for Pub. Integrity, 387 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005).
87. See, e.g., Q Int'l Courier, Inc. v. Seagraves, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1982,
1985 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating that privilege is not absolute and will fail if statement is
published with actual malice).
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report in cases where state laws differ as to whether the report would be
protected.
C. Substantial Truth
The substantial truth doctrine has been used to protect allegedly
false speech in cases where a proposition is allegedly false, but the
proposition is presented in a context that conveys a larger truth. This
doctrine expressly acknowledges the difference between the truth of a
proposition and the larger truth expressed by an assertion.
88
In Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. New York Times Co., the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling that the statements that
an Islamic charity was "suspected" of having terrorist ties were
"substantially true. Whether the charity, the Global Relief Foundation
("GRF"), actually had ties to terrorists was irrelevant. The trial court
ruled that the "gist" or "sting" of the articles was that the federal
government was investigating GRF for possible links to terrorism and
was considering freezing its assets.90 The appellate court concurred and
found that the articles were substantially true because the government
investigation was truly occurring, regardless of whether GRF was
actually guilty. 91 The case illustrates how a court can reasonably find
88. 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2004).
89. Id at 980.
90. Id. at 986-87.
91. Id The appellate court also noted that the substantial truth doctrine as
interpreted under Illinois law had been applied in cases involving private figures. Id.
at 987-89 (citing Vachet v. Cent. Newspapers, Inc., 816 F.2d 313, 313-14 (7th Cir.
1987) (involving a paper that reported that Vachet had been arrested on a warrant for
harboring a fugitive; the court found statement was substantially true even though
warrant had never been issued because he was arrested and was associated with the
fugitive); Gist v. Macon Cnty. Sherriff's Dep't, 671 N.E.2d 1154, 1154-55 (lll. App.
1996) (finding the sheriffs department not liable for posting a "most wanted" flier
for plaintiff because the gist of the claim that he was wanted on an arrest warrant
was substantially true); Sivulich v. Howard Publ'ns, Inc., 466 N.E.2d 1218, 1220
(Ill. App. 1984) (regarding a newspaper that reported that battery "charges" were
filed against plaintiff because claim was substantially true; the fact that civil charges
were filled rather than criminal charges was immaterial because the whole context of
the article made clear that it was a civil case). Another jurisdiction has applied the
same reasoning. See Bryant v. Cox Enters, Inc., 715 S.E.2d 458, 467 (Ga. App.
2011) (holding that thatestate of Richard Jewell, the security guard who was
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that a statement reflects a true state of affairs in the world, regardless of
whether the propositional content of the statement was true or not.
This interpretation of the substantial truth doctrine has not been
widespread because it is contrary to the common law republication rule,
which holds a publisher liable for repeating false statements. But, like
neutral reportage and fair report, the substantial truth defense has been
applied in cases where a statement was offered for some reason other
than to prove the truth of the proposition. In Global Relief the speaker
was not trying to prove that GRF had ties to terrorists; the speaker was
trying to inform the public that the government was undertaking such an
investigation.92 It is a case where there is a true fact in the world that
necessarily contains a (potentially false) defamatory implication. A
reasonable listener must distinguish between what the speaker could
know (that the investigation exists) from what the speaker could not
know and could not reasonably attempt to convey (whether GRF is
guilty). In short, the statements could not reasonably be understood to
convey actual facts about guilt or innocence or be offered to prove the
truth of the underlying matter asserted.
D. The Third-Party Allegation Rule
Texas has adopted a principle similar to the above-described
interpretation of the substantial truth doctrine, called the "third-party
allegation rule." Under the rule, "a media defendant can establish the
substantial truth of a publication reporting that third parties are asserting
or alleging facts by proving that the allegations were made and
accurately reported, without regard to whether the underlying allegations
being reported are themselves true or false." 93
Plaintiffs have argued that this interpretation is contrary to the
common law rule that a publisher is liable for republishing false
investigated as a suspect following the 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing, cannot
recover for libel because the statements about the FBI's investigation were
substantially true, even if he was not actually guilty).
92. See Global ReliefFound, 390 F.3d at 989.
93. Neely v. Wilson, 331 S.W.3d 900, 913 (Tex. App. 2011), reh'g granted,
2012 Tex. LEXIS 499 (Tex. June 15, 2012).
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defamatory statements made by others.94 However, the Texas courts
have noted that, absent the third-party allegation rule, the media would
risk liability when reporting allegations of misconduct:
Otherwise, the media would be subject to potential
liability everytime it reported an investigation of
alleged misconduct or wrongdoing by a private
person, public official or public figure. Such
allegations would never be reported by the media
for fear an investigation or other proceeding might
later prove the allegations untrue, thereby
subjecting the media to suit for defamation.
Furthermore, when would an allegation be proven
true or untrue for purposes of defamation? After
an investigation? After a court trial? After an
appeal? Undoubtedly, the volume of litigation and
concomitant chilling effect on the media under
such circumstances would be incalculable. First
Amendment considerations aside, common sense
does not dictate any conclusion other than the one
we reach today. 9 5
The Texas courts have relied on this interpretation of substantial truth to
protect a wide variety of reports.9 6 Upon review, it seems that the media
benefits from the third-party allegation rule mostly in cases where private
94. See id. at 918 (quoting Jacobs v. Mcllvain, 759 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex.
App. 1988), rev'd, 794 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1990) ("Although [defendants'] argument
of 'truth' as a complete defense has much to commend it, the law does not generally
immunize the propagation of defamatory statements. It is no defense to say, 'It is
alleged that . . . ."')).
95. KTRK Television v. Felder, 950 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Tex. App. 1997)
(applying third party allegation rule and granting summary judgment to media
defendants in case involving media report of allegations that a teacher had abused
students).
96. See Neely, 331 S.W.3d at 919-20 (citing Grotti v. Belo Corp., 188 S.W.3d
768 (Tex. App. 2006); Associated Press v. Boyd, No. 05-04-01172-CV, 2005 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3715 (Tex. App. May 16, 2005); UTV of San Antonio, Inc. v.
Ardmore, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. App. 2002); ABC, Inc. v. Gill, 6 S.W.3d 19
(Tex. App. 1999)). See also, Green v. CBS, 286 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
that a report in a 48 Hours segment was "substantially true" under Texas law
because it accurately reported the allegations that were made, without regard to the
underlying truth of the allegations).
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parties are involved. After all, in cases involving allegations of
wrongdoing against public officials or public figures, the actual malice
standard would generally protect the media. However, we know that the
actual malice standard fails to protect the media in some important cases,
such as Norton, where the allegations made were clearly untrue, and yet
the reporting of the allegations was nevertheless newsworthy and
important to the community. The third-party allegation rule, therefore,
eliminates much of the uncertainty that publishers otherwise face with
respect to liability and attempting to determine whether newsworthy
statements will be protected under the existing constitutional protections.
Again, in all of these cases, as with all of the cases discussed in the
sections above, the media was not making assertions to prove the truth of
the proposition. The statements were made for some other purpose-to
show belief, motive, or the existence of a controversy.
The Texas Supreme Court is currently considering whether to
affirm the third-party allegation rule as a principle of Texas law. 9 7 It is
possible that the court will decide that the rule is too broad or that it is
not quite ready to abandon the common law republication rule.
Nevertheless, the existence of the third-party allegation rule is important
because it shows that people are becoming aware that the actual malice
standard is inadequate as the sole vehicle for constitutional protection in
libel cases. There are cases where the actual malice standard does not
apply, and yet the speech should be protected. It may be the case that the
third-party allegation rule is not adequately refined. Even if it is
overturned, a court might consider adopting a test more like the one I
propose herein, which gives greater protection to speech in the cases
where the actual malice rule does not apply but does not necessarily
allow any and all republication.
E. Statements of Opinion
At first glance, the protection courts have granted to statements
of opinion may seem different from the defenses above. The defenses of
neutral reportage, fair report, substantial truth, and third-party allegations
are all applied to "factual assertions," which libel law treats as different
97. See Neely v. Wilson, 331 S.W.3d 900, 913 (Tex. App. 2011), reh'g
granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 499 (Tex. June 15, 2012).
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from "opinions." However, in many cases, opinions share a
characteristic with the assertions protected by the other defenses: they are
often not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. They are
offered for another purpose-to express the belief, viewpoint, or motive
of the speaker.
More importantly, the distinction between a "factual assertion"
and an "opinion" is fuzzy, and many courts have acknowledged the
difficulty distinguishing the two. "Categorizing a defendant's statements
as either fact or opinion . .. is often not an easy task. As one commenter
has noted, '[n]o area of modem libel law can be murkier than the
cavernous depths of this inquiry."' 98 Much of the difficulty involves the
very issue I raise: when is the statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, and when is it offered for some other purpose, such as to
express the viewpoint of the speaker? A large part of the confusion
stems from the fact that people generally express opinions because they
believe them to represent the true state of affairs; they have "opinions"
about "facts" in the world.99 People have, for example, opinions about
whether former President George W. Bush lied about Iraq or whether
O.J. Simpson is guilty of killing his wife. An expression of opinion on
such topics is generally understood to be an opinion, largely because
reasonable people understand that no one (other than Bush or Simpson)
has inside knowledge about whether Bush lied or O.J. Simpson murdered
anyone, and thus it would not be reasonable for the audience to adopt the
opinion of the speaker merely because the statement was made. Such
statements are not offered-and could not reasonably be interpreted-as
proof of the matter asserted.'o Statements like "Bush lied" or "O.J.
98. Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting BRUCE W.
SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, § 5.1 (1997)).
99. The other large part of the problem is the dual nature of "assertion" as a
speech act. Assertions attempt to show how things are, i.e. to state facts, but they
also require belief as a sincerity condition, and thus they also serve to express belief,
which is often interpreted as opinion. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.C. 1.
100. To borrow phrasing from Hustler, the statements cannot be reasonably
understood as conveying actual facts because it is obvious that the speaker would not
have access to the facts. The only reasonable interpretation is that the statements are
a conclusion, and conclusions are usually protected as a form of opinion. See, e.g.,
Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing a book about toxic tort
litigation that gave mixed information, but allowed readers to draw their own
conclusions); Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that
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Simpson is guilty" are factual assertions in terms of semantic content, but
upon reflection must be considered "opinions," because they obviously
reflect the belief of the speaker.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether opinions
should receive constitutional protection in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal,
Co.101 Milkovich arose from a sports column in which the author said
that Maple Heights High School wrestling coach Michael Milkovich
"lied.,
102
Milkovich's team had been involved in an altercation at a
wrestling match; his team was placed on probation and deemed ineligible
for the state tournament. 10 3 There was a subsequent hearing that resulted
in the overturning of the probation and ineligibility orders.104 In response
to that outcome, J. Theodore Diadiun wrote a column with the heading
"Maple beat the law with the 'big lie."' 105  It featured Diadiun's
photograph and "the words 'TD Says,"' with a carryover headline
reading, ". . . Diadiun says Maple told a lie."' 06 The column said, in
pertinent part:
When a person takes on a job in a school, whether
it be as a teacher, coach, administrator or even
maintenance worker, it is well to remember that his
primary job is that of educator. There is scarcely a
person concerned with school who doesn't leave
his mark in some way on the young people who
pass his way-many are the lessons taken away
from school by students which weren't learned
from a lesson plan or out of a book. They come
from personal experiences with and observations of
their superiors and peers, from watching actions
and reactions. Such a lesson was learned (or
relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
a book review accusing author of "sloppy journalism" was a conclusion supported
by stated facts).
101. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
102. Id at 4-5.
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Heights High School, and by anyone who attended
the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet of last Feb. 8. A
lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the
past year, is well they learned early. It is simply
this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out. If you're
successful enough, and powerful enough, and can
sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent
chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of
what really happened. The teachers responsible
were mainly head Maple wrestling coach, Mike
Milkovich, and former superintendent of schools
H. Donald Scott. Last winter they were faced with
a difficult situation. Milkovich's ranting from the
side of the mat and egging the crowd on against the
meet official and the opposing team backfired
during a meet with [Mentor], and resulted in first
the Maple Heights team, then many of the partisan
crowd attacking the Mentor squad in a brawl which
sent four Mentor wrestlers to the hospital.
Naturally, when Mentor protested to the governing
body of high school sports . . . the two men were
called on the carpet to account for the incident.
But they declined to walk into the hearing and face
up to their responsibilities, as one would hope a
coach of Milkovich's accomplishments and
reputation would do, and one would certainly
expect from a man with the responsible position of
superintendent of schools. Instead they chose to
come to the hearing and misrepresent the things
that happened . . . attempting not only to convince
the board of their own innocence, but, incredibly,
shift the blame of the affair to Mentor. I was
among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet ... and
I also attended the hearing ... so I was in a unique
position of being the only non-involved party to
observe both the meet itself and the Milkovich-
Scott version presented to the board.
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"I can say that some of the stories told to the judge
sounded pretty darned unfamiliar," said Dr. Harold
Meyer, commissioner of the OHSAA, who
attended the hearing. "It certainly sounded different
from what they told us." Nevertheless, the judge
bought their story, and ruled in their favor.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be
from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer,
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at
the hearing after each having given his solemn oath
to tell the truth. But they got away with it. Is that
the kind of lesson we want our young people
learning from their high school administrators and
coaches? I think not.107
Superintendent Scott had also sued for defamation, and his case reached
the Ohio Supreme Court first.1os The court in Scott's case ruled that the
statements were opinion, following the test set forth in Oilman v.
Evans.109 The Olman test used four factors to determine whether a
statement was fact or opinion: "(1) the specific language used; (2)
whether the statement is verifiable; (3) the general context of the
statement; and (4) the broader context in which the statement
appeared." 110
In Scott v. News-Herald, the court determined that, even though
the first two factors suggested the statements were factual assertions,
they were outweighed by the second two factors, which indicated that the
statement was opinion."' The court found that "the large caption 'TD
Says' . . . would indicate to even the most gullible reader that the article
was, in fact, opinion."' 12 The court also ruled that the "broader context"
was a sports page, "a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and
107. Id. at 5 n.2.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Prior to
Milkovich, Olman was probably the most influential court ruling on the topic of
distinguishing factual assertions from opinions.
110. Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
111. Id. at8.
112. Id. (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio 1986)).
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hyperbole."' 1 3 Thus, the court felt that a reader would interpret the
article as a whole as opinion; and while Diadiun may have made up his
.114
mind, the reader was free to come to an alternate conclusion.
Moreover, a reader would not expect a sports columnist to be an expert
in perjury law, and thus any legal conclusions in the context of a sports
column would be interpreted as opinion.
In light of its ruling in Scott, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that
Milkovich's case was likewise meritless.l16 The U.S. Supreme Court
then granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court stated that the dictum from Gertz, that "there
is 'no such thing as a false idea,""' 8 was not intended "to create a
wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled
'opinion."'ll9 In fact, the Court took a rather dim view of "opinion:"
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a
liar," he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to
the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if
the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or
incomplete, or if his assessment of them is
erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements
in terms of opinion does not dispel these
implications; and the statement, "In my opinion
Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to
reputation as the statement, "Jones is a liar." As
Judge Friendly aptly stated: "[It] would be
destructive of the law of libel if a writer could
escape liability for accusations of [defamatory
113. Id (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 708).
114. Id at n.3 (citing Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707-10).
115. Id. at n.4 (citing Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 708).
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 18 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
119. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339).
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conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly,
the words 'I think."'l
20
The Court also rejected the notion that the statements could be opinion in
context. It drew a distinction between statements like, "[i]n my opinion
Mayor Jones is a liar," which implied facts, and "[i]n my opinion Mayor
Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx
and Lenin," which "would not be actionable."', 2 1 The Court noted that
"the Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell ine of cases provides protection for
statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts'
about an individual," but declined to find that Diadiun's statements were
of that nature.122 Thus, the Court concluded:
We are not persuaded that, in addition to these
protections, an additional separate constitutional
privilege for "opinion" is required to ensure the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The dispositive question in the
present case then becomes whether a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the statements in the
Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner
Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial
proceeding. We think this question must be
answered in the affirmative . . . . This is not the sort
of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which
would negate the impression that the writer was
seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the
crime of perjury. Nor does the general tenor of the
article negate this impression.123
The difficulty with Milkovich is that the speaker's use of the term "liar"
can be interpreted as either a factual assertion or an opinion, depending
on context. My reading of the case is that the Court interpreted
Diadiun's column to be an assertion of fact because, it believed, he was
making the statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Court
120. Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted). I think the Court's analysis was flawed,
as explained infra Sections IV & V.
121. Id at 20.
122. Id. (internal citation omitted) (referencing Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) and Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)).
123, Id. at 21.
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concluded that a jury could find that Diadiun implied that he did have
particular knowledge as to whether Milkovich lied (unlike my example
given above where someone claims that "Bush lied").124 It should have
been possible to express the belief that Milkovich lied in a manner that
would be interpreted as an "opinion," if the tone had been different.125
The lesson drawn by many courts from Milkovich is not that
opinions cannot be protected, but that where there is ambiguity about
whether the statement is a factual assertion or opinion, the courts should
err on the side of finding the statement to be a factual assertion if the
statement seems to imply particular knowledge of unstated facts.126
Many courts, however, still employ a test examining the context of the
statement to determine whether it is a factual assertion or opinion. The
Ninth Circuit has said:
124. Id. at 6. Also, compare the outcome of Milkovich to Edwards, where the
statement at issue referred to scientists as "liars." See supra notes 65-71 and
accompanying text. In Edwards, it was clear that the speaker was not claiming to
have particular knowledge of any untruth; he was merely reporting the existence of a
controversy, to which the public had access to the same facts as the author.
125. The Court referred to the common law "fair comment" privilege and did
not reject the notion that "fair comment" should legitimately be protected.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14, 19. However, the Court noted limitations on what was
"fair," affirming that any express or implied false factual assertion could be
actionable. Id. at 19. It was not Diadiun's belief that was actionable, but the manner
in which he expressed it.
126. For a good discussion of the consequences of Milkovich, see Nat Stem,
Defamation, Epistemology, and the Erosion (But Not Destruction) of the Opinion
Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REV. 595 (1990). For a concise critique of Milkovich and its
logical inconsistencies, see Leonard M. Niehoff, Opinions, Implications, and
Confusions, 28 COMMC'Ns LAWYER 3 (Nov. 2011). Niehoff notes that the courts
have been inconsistent in their "views about how human beings process and
experience what they view and hear." Id. For example, the fair comment privilege
embodies an optimistic view: people are rational; they spot faulty arguments; they
know when conclusions do not follow from premises; and they challenge unfair
accusations. The doctrine of defamation by implication embodies a pessimistic view:
people are suckers; they mistake innuendo for evidence; they make snap judgments;
and they are seduced by insinuation. Id. In reality, I suspect some humans are
rational and others are suckers. Nevertheless, I would argue that an important goal of
the law should be to set an example of what we expect of our fellow humans, and we
should expect them to aspire to be rational. Intellectual sloppiness should be met
with disdain and correction, rather than legal affirmation.
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To determine whether an alleged defamatory
statement implies a factual assertion, we examine
the "totality of the circumstances" in which the
statement was made. We look at the statement both
"in its broad context," considering "the general
tenor of the entire work, the subject of the
statements, the setting, and the format of the
work," and in its "specific context," noting the
"content of the statements," the "extent of
figurative or hyperbolic language used," and "the
reasonable expectations of the audience in that
particular situation."' 27
The Second Circuit employs a similar test: A court must analyze
statements "in the context of the entire communication," including the
circumstances in which it was written, and its tone and apparent
purpose.128 The Second Circuit considers:
(1) an assessment of whether the specific language
in issue has a precise meaning which is readily
understood or whether it is indefinite and
ambiguous; (2) a determination of whether the
statement is capable of being objectively
characterized as true or false; (3) an examination of
the full context of the communication in which the
statement appears; and (4) a consideration of the
broader social context or setting surrounding the
communication including the existence of any
applicable customs or conventions which might
signal to readers or listeners that what is being read
or heard is likely to be opinion.129
127. Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal
citations omitted) (citing Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th
Cir. 1995) (concerning pop singer George Michael making a music video parodying
his arrest; statement that police officer masturbated in front of him was a "factual
assertion" and not "opinion" in context).
128. Pisani v. Staten Island Univ. Hospital, No. 06-CV-1016 (JFB)(MLO),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30855, at *33-34 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2008).
129. Id. at *34-35.
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The Second Circuit also considers certain characteristics that may
distinguish factual assertions from opinions. Statements made early in
an investigation, for example, are likely to be opinion, as opposed to
statements made after exhaustive research. 30 The court also considers
"rhetorical indicators" such as the use of "appeared to be," "might well
be," "could well happen," or "should be. ," Such phrases signal
presumptions or predictions rather than factual assertions.132 Finally, an
opinion may be speech characterized as "rhetorical hyperbole, parody, or
loose or figurative" speech.133
Such tests make sense because, as noted above, people often
hold and express "opinions" about "facts" in the world, and thus it is
necessary to decipher whether the statement is offered merely to express
belief, which should be protected, or whether the assertion is intended to
serve as proof of the matter asserted.
This distinction-between a statement offered as "proof' of an
assertion versus as an expression of belief-was highlighted in a recent
decision by a New York appellate court, Sandals Resorts International
Ltd., v. Google, Inc.13 Sandals involved an anonymous email that was
forwarded to "undisclosed recipients," the gist of which was that Sandals
receives subsidies from the Jamaican government, funded by Jamaican
taxpayers, yet the resorts hire only foreigners for management positions
and will hire Jamaicans only for low-paying, menial positions. Large
portions of the email were written in ALLCAPS, and included spelling
136and grammatical errors. The court found that several factors
contributed to its conclusion that the email was protected opinion and not
actionable,137 including the fact that anonymous email, by its nature,
130. Id at *35-36 (referencing Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d
348, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
131. Id. at *36.
132. Id. at *35-36.
133. Id. at *37.
134. 86 A.D.3d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
135. Id at 35.
136. Id.
137. Sandals was seeking an order to compel Google, Inc. to identify the IP
address of an anonymous email sender who used Google's email service. Id. at 37-
38. In order to overcome the presumption in favor of anonymity, Sandals would
have to prove that the statements at issue would be actionable. Id. at 38.
20121 THE PROBLEM WITH SULLIVAN 207
should not be taken seriously. The most important factor, however,
was that the statements were offered to express concern, to ask questions,
and to express a viewpoint:
Considering the e-mail in question here as a whole,
we find that it is an exercise in rhetoric, seeking to
raise questions in the mind of the reader regarding
the role of Jamaican nationals in the Sandals resorts
located in Jamaica. It is replete with rhetorical
questions, asked either in relation to a link to an
article about Sandals' companies or executives or
in relation to a link to a photograph from the
resorts' on-line public relations materials. Its
apparent purpose is not to characterize Sandals
Resorts as racist. It is to call to the reader's
attention the writer's belief that the native people
of Jamaica, specifically the taxpayers, are
providing financial support for the resorts on their
island, but are not reaping commensurate financial
rewards for that investment.
The tone of the e-mail, as well, indicates that the
writer is expressing his or her personal views, in
that it reflects a degree of anger and resentment at
the idea that travel agents make money from the
success of Sandals, and foreign nationals earn large
salaries from the resorts, while native Jamaicans
benefit financially only by being hired for service
jobs at the resorts.
To the extent the e-mail suggests that Sandals'
hiring of native Jamaicans is limited to menial and
low-paying jobs, a reasonable reader would
138. The court noted that the "culture of Internet communications, as distinct
from that of print media such as newspapers and magazines, has been characterized
as encouraging a 'freewheeling, anything-goes writing style' and thus readers give
less credence to defamatory statements made on the Internet. Id. at 43. Anonymity
also indicates that the reader will view the material with skepticism. Id. at 44.
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understand that as an allegation to be investigated,
rather than as a fact.
Nor does the e-mail imply that it is based upon
undisclosed facts; on the contrary, each remark is
prompted by or responsive to a hyperlink, that is, it
is "accompanied by a recitation of the facts upon
which it is based," and therefore qualifies as "pure
opinion... .*"39
These expressive purposes were apparent to the court and therefore
deemed worthy of protection. However, in many jurisdictions, the
protection extended to "opinion" is guaranteed only where it is clear that
the statement represents the opinions or mindset of the speaker. If the
statement appears to be an assertion, then courts may take the approach
of the Milkovich Court and rule that the statement is an actionable factual
140
assertion.
Thus, it should be apparent that the law surrounding the
protection of opinion is murky, at best. As I will argue in more detail
below, the Milkovich standard does not fully consider the range of
expressive possibility between "factual assertions" and "opinions," and
the failure to do so perpetuates the confusion about what kind of
statements should receive constitutional protection. What I am arguing
for is a better, more consistent standard in libel cases: To evaluate
whether the statement is offered for the purpose of proving the
proposition contained therein.
139. Id. at 42-43 (citations omitted). It should be noted that the court also
acknowledged that New York law extends greater protection to speech than the
protection granted by the Supreme Court in Milkovich. Id. at 40.
140. There is also some risk that jokes, usually protected as not expressing
factual assertions, may not be protected if the court believes the statements assert
facts. See Martin v. Mun. Publ'ns, 510 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (permitting
"Mummer" to sue magazine for humorous caption under photo); see also Ford. v.
Rowland, 562 So.2d 731, 734-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (permitting city official
to sue for satirical poem mocking an election and possibly referring to candidate as a
"hooker").
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IV. RELEVANT PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
An important premise of this Article is that there is a significant
difference between statements offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted and statements that are made for some other expressive purpose.
Unfortunately, lawyers and judges have not developed adequate
terminology for making the distinction between different kinds of
expressive purposes.
Philosophers, however, have written extensively on what is
called "philosophy of language," an effort to better understand the world
by understanding how we use language and the effect it has. They have
developed terminology and ideas that are particularly relevant to the
issues in libel cases. I will therefore explain some of the concepts and
terms used by philosophers because they will help clarify the issues that
have perplexed libel lawyers and courts.
A. Propositions
Unfortunately, there is no simple definition of a proposition.141
For the purposes of this Article, I am using the term to refer to the
content of a statement, and I can best explain the concept by example.
Consider the following sentences:
(1) President Obama is a Muslim.
(2) John says that President Obama is a Muslim.
Both statements contain the same proposition: the proposition is
that President Obama is a Muslim. But sentence (2) is a more complex
statement that contains that proposition within a larger proposition-that
John says it. The two statements have different "truth conditions."
Statement (1) is true if and only if President Obama actually is a Muslim.
Sentence (2) is true if and only if John says that he is. The proposition
contained within the sentence (that President Obama is a Muslim) may
be false. Yet the sentence as a whole may represent a true state of affairs
in the world: namely, that John says that President Obama is a Muslim.
141. See generally Matthew McGrath, Propositions, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Dec. 19, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives
/fa112008/entries/propositions.
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It may be true that John says that, even if the contained proposition is not
true.
This illustrates a practical conflict between the principles of libel
law and the way the world works: people often believe things that are not
true. The false beliefs that seem to be fairly common range from
believing your spouse to be faithful or unfaithful; that your boss, co-
worker, teacher, or whomever is out to get you; that you are smarter,
prettier, or more important that you really are; or that other people are
more horrible than they truly are.
The existence of such false beliefs is an important fact in itself,
though. False beliefs are part of the truth of the way the world is, and
knowing that John holds a false belief tells you something about John,
even if it tells you nothing about the fact believed. The Court has, on
occasion, made oblique references to the importance of "the
ascertainment of truth," which seems to indicate a broader appreciation
for truth as a state of affairs in the world, as opposed to the truth of a
particular proposition.142 Nevertheless, the focus in many libel cases has
been on the truth of a statement's propositional content, not on whether it
reflects a larger truth. 14 3 Such a focus has contributed to the "Sullivan
gap." The focus should be shifted away from the truth or falsity of a
proposition and towards a consideration of the overall expressive value
of the statement.
142. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
143. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990)
(explaining that the expression, "[i]n my opinion, John Jones is a liar," should be
interpreted as an assertion that the propositional content of the statement-that John
Jones is a liar-is true). The Milkovich Court does not address the potential
complexity of interpreting statements for their expressive value. The statement, "[i]n
my opinion, John Jones is a liar," could be interpreted as reflecting the larger state of
affairs in the world, namely, that the speaker has a particular mindset that causes him
to subjectively believe that John is a liar, regardless of whether that is a well-
founded opinion. The audience would need to know whether the speaker's opinions
were credible before it would be reasonable to adopt the belief as one's own; but
more importantly, the statement would have to be made in a context where it would
be reasonable for the audience to take the statement as proof of the propositional
content. The statement could very well be made in a context where it is obviously
not an assertion but reflecting a valid difference of opinion or used as rhetorical
hyperbole.
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B. Speech Acts: Propositions Plus "Force"
Philosophers have long recognized that propositions themselves
are "communicatively inert."l44 A proposition must come in some
context that conveys its meaning to the audience. That context is called
"illocutionary force"-the qualitative nature that communicates the
speaker's point.145 The concept of illocutionary force is crucial to
deciding what "speech act" is performed by the speaker.
The terminology may sound technical or intimidating, but the
concepts are quite simple. Locution is simply an utterance. A
locutionary act is making a sentence, putting words together. An
illocutionary act is a locutionary act plus "force."1 46 The illocutionary
force of a sentence is the characteristic that indicates whether the speaker
is making an assertion, asking a question, expressing desire, reporting the
thoughts of a third party, guessing, or engaging in some other type of
expressive act. Writing "President Obama is a Muslim" is a locutionary
act, and it becomes an illocutionary act only if I put assertive force into it
to transform it into an assertion. Alternately, I could be joking, asking a
question, reporting what John said, or guessing as to his religion.
(Technically, in this case, I am engaging only in a locutionary act,
putting no force whatsoever into those words. I use them without any
force and only as a collection of words to illustrate the point that those
words could convey various ideas depending on the force someone might
use if they so choose.) The same utterance can be interpreted differently,
depending on the illocutionary force behind the statement.
It may be the case that a statement's illocutionary force is
ambiguous. For example, if a person says, "you'll be more punctual in
the future," it may be either a prediction or a command. 147 It is therefore
appropriate for the audience to ask the speaker what he or she means if
the meaning is unclear.148
144. Mitchell Green, Speech Acts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., § 2.1 (Spring
2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/speech-acts/.
145. See AUSTIN, supra note 10, at Lecture VIII.
146. See id.
147. Green, supra note 144, § 2.1.
148. Green acknowledges that the force of the utterance is not always clear:
"This is why it would be appropriate for someone who doesn't know the force of my
utterance, to ask, '[d]o you mean that as an assertion, a conjecture, a guess, or
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A perlocutionary act is one in which the hearer's reaction
matters. Persuading, for example, is a type of perlocutionary act. A
speaker cannot persuade a hearer that President Obama is a Muslim
merely by asserting it; the hearer must have a reaction in which the
hearer comes to believe the propositional content. The problem with
some interpretations of libel law is that it attempts to create liability for
mere locutionary acts.149 Libeling, I will argue, requires perlocutionary
effects5 o and should require a particular illocutionary force: telling,
which essentially means that the speaker is attempting to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.
C. The Speech Acts Relevant to Libel Law
There are many types of speech acts, but I will restrict my
discussion to the few that are most relevant to libel claims, such as
asserting, conjecturing, guessing, reporting, and telhng.
what?' MITCHELL S. GREEN, SELF-EXPRESSION 73 (Oxford Univ. Press, ed. 2007).
See also id. at 161-62 ("[S]peakers often fail to convey the force with which their
indicative sentences are uttered.").
149. See, e.g., Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19. The Milkovich Court stated that
the phrase, "John Jones is a liar," should be actionable, even though the sentence
alone is merely a locutionary act with no illocutionary force. Id. An audience would
not know from the sentence alone whether the statement was intended as an
assertion, a joke, a question or some other form of speech act. It would not be
reasonable to assume that there was any particular illocutionary force absent
additional information or context to understand the statement.
150. The perlocutionary nature of libel is theoretically reflected in the
requirement that a plaintiff prove damages. There must be actual damage to a
plaintiffs reputation, meaning that the statement had a perlocutionary effect on the
audience whereby they came to believe the defamatory false fact at issue. However,
damages are presumed in many cases. It may be inappropriate to allow libel claims
where there is no evidence that anyone believed the statement to be true, i.e., where
there were no perlocutionary effects. See, e.g., Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y.
Times Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 425, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (involving a jury that found
that the New York Times had made a defamatory statement about plaintiff, but
awarded no damages because no actual harm occurred). Such a rule would be more
consistent with the principle underlying Hustler, that a statement should not form the
basis of liability where no one would reasonably believe it states facts about the
plaintiff.
151. Each kind of speech act has "felicity conditions" and "sincerity
conditions," conditions that help clarify whether the speech act was properly made
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1. Assertions
Libel law has traditionally made a distinction between "factual
assertions" and "opinions," despite long-standing acknowledgment that it
is extremely difficult to distinguish the two.152 The reason that it has
been difficult is precisely the nature of assertion. Philosophers generally
agree that assertion is an attempt to state how things are-in other words,
to state facts. However, assertions also express belief,15 3 and we often
interpret belief as opinion.154 It is therefore impossible to parse
assertions from opinions in a pure sense; we can only use the context of
or not. It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to spell out all of the
conditions-it will suffice to provide, as I do below, a short summary of the
distinction between them.
152. Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1997).
153. Belief is the "sincerity condition" for an assertion.
154. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text discussing "Bush lied" or
"OJ Simpson is guilty," statements we deem to be opinions even though, on the
surface, they purport to state how things are. Green also cites examples of statements
that have expressive meaning (and which I suspect would be likely to be protected as
"opinion" by the courts) yet also have semantic content: "Idiot," "knucklehead,"
"pinhead," and "moron" all have a semantic meaning that the object is not
intelligent. GREEN, supra note 148, at 149. However, they also have an expressive
meaning, which is to express an attitude of condescension towards the object's
intelligence. Id. See also Hopewell v. Vitullo, 701 N.E.2d 99, 105 (1Il. App. 1998)
(stating "we note that in one sense all opinions imply facts; however the question of
whether a statement is actionable is one of degree . . .," and finding that a statement
that someone was fired for being "incompetent" was too vague to be actionable).
Philosophers, however, generally describe "opinion" as something unverifiable or
unprovable." See Stem, supra note 126, at 614 (citing DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
236 (D. Runes, ed. 1983); DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION (W. Reese ed.
1987)). While the legal field also embraces this definition of opinion, see, e.g.,
Seelig v. Infinity Broad., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. App. 2002) (finding that a
reference to the plaintiff as "skank" is an unverifiable opinion, not a fact), it also
uses the term "opinion" more broadly to apply to conclusions, as long as it is clear
how the speaker came to his conclusion. See, e.g., Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282, 289
(1st Cir. 2002) (discussing a book about toxic tort litigation that gave mixed
information, but allowed readers to draw their own conclusions, even if the author
had a viewpoint); Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that a book review accusing an author of "sloppy journalism" was a
conclusion supported by stated facts). Thus, the fuzzy line between facts and
opinions is due to the nature of "assertion" as having dual uses, and the lack of
articulation in certain terms used by lawyers to reflect different kinds of expression.
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the statement to decipher whether the speaker is expressing some idea
that the courts wish to protect, thereby rendering the nomination
"opinion" more of a conclusion than a distinct category of speech.155
What is missing from the analysis in libel cases is how assertions
are used. Assertions are sometimes used to state how things are, and
sometimes they are used to express belief. The expression of belief
should be constitutionally protected activity-what courts deem to be
"opinion" -even if it comes in the linguistic form of an "assertion." We
must therefore distinguish between assertions made for an expressive
purpose, such as to show one's sincere belief or state of mind," from
assertions made for the purpose of urging others to adopt as fact the
matter asserted (which is "telling," described in the section below).
It is worth noting that there are several subcategories of
assertion. The concept of assertion represents a continuum of speech,
ranging from guesses to conclusions to predictions to insults, and each
kind of assertion has its own norms. Philosophers have long recognized
the distinctions. Courts have made some distinctions, protecting, for
example, conjecture, conclusions, or insults. But courts have not yet
noted the distinction between telling (another subcategory of assertion)
and the expression of belief. It is, however, an important distinction.
People generally recognize that there is a difference between: (a) stating
belief but acknowledging that the thing one believes is a disputed fact
and others may not believe it; (b) stating belief and asserting that the
155. This notion is also expressed by Stern, supra note 126, at 595.
156. Making a statement can be a form of self-expression. GREEN, supra note
148, at 26 ("[S]tatements themselves have an expressive component: a statement
purports to be an expression of belief, and if it is sincere it is such an expression.").
See also JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING IN Focus,
BOOK IlI, Chapter X (Gary Fuller et al. eds., 2000) ("[W]e should have a great many
fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our
ideas only; and not for things themselves."). A contemporary example from a libel
case can be found in Piscatelli v. Smith, 35 A.3d 1140, 1146 (Md. 2012), where a
newspaper was sued for reporting on a murder. The paper included statements from
the victim's mother concerning her belief about who might have had a motive to kill
her son. Id. at 1149-50. The statements should be protected because they show the
mother's belief or state of mind and cannot be reasonably construed to convey actual
facts about who murdered the son, since no one knows who the murderer was. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the paper was protected under a
combination of the fair report privilege and the opinion privilege. Id. at 1150, 1152-
54.
20121 215
thing one believes is a fact but understanding the audience will examine
the facts on its own; and (c) stating that there is a state of affairs and
expecting the audience to adopt it as fact because the speaker said it.15
The difficulty is that all three intents, (a), (b), and (c), may be
expressed with the same statement, and it will be up to the audience to
determine which intent is most likely (or to ask for clarification). " For
example, suppose someone says, "God exists." Such a statement could
be made in any of the three contexts above, but the circumstances
surrounding the statement will indicate which one. A scenario where a
person is in a debate with an atheist about the existence of God will
probably fall into category (a) or (b), whereas the Pope giving a sermon
and making the same statement would likely fall into category (c).
2. Telling
It is useful here to distinguish "asserting" from "telling."
Example (c) above, where the speaker asserts for the purpose of having
the audience adopt the truth of the assertion based upon the speaker's
assertion is a specific kind of speech act termed "telling." To illustrate
the point, Professor Mitch Green refers to the story of Herod presenting
Salome with St. John's severed head on a charger:
Herod is not telling Salome anything .... Salome
does not have to take his word for anything. She
can see the severed head for herself if she can bring
157. "It is important, perhaps crucial, to communication that we take the words
of others, often though of course not always, at face value." GREEN, supra note 148,
at 59 (recognizing that "telling" and "promising" would be hamstrung if we could
not rely on others' words, but acknowledging that there are cases where speakers do
not always intend to have others rely upon their word; for example, when "a person
who takes an unpopular stand, espousing her beliefs without any intention that her
audience will come to agree with her"). The difference between "asserting" (options
(a) and (b)) and "telling" (option (c)) is discussed below.
158. See Randall P. Bezanson & Kathryn L. Ingle, Plato's Cave Revisited: The
Epistemology of Perception in Contemporary Defamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REV.
585, 597 (1985-86) (stating that "the textual content of the words should not be
determinative, especially if the range of possible meanings of the text is broad, and,
consequently, the communicator's subjective intention cannot be governed
reasonably by a single meaning of the text"); see also id at 606 (arguing that the
facts of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), "[render]
unhelpful trivial distinctions between fact and opinion, and truth and falsity").
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herself to look. By contrast, . . . telling requires a
speaker to intend to convey information (or alleged
information) in a way that relies crucially upon
taking her at her word.159
Thus, we should be able to discern the difference between "I think
Milkovich lied," which expresses belief but recognizes your option to
disagree, and "I'm telling you, Milkovich lied," which indicates that the
speaker wants you to believe the proposition because the speaker told
you. The former should be an expressive use that is constitutionally
protected, whereas the latter may be actionable, assuming all other
elements of a libel claim are met and no other defenses apply.
One crucial aspect of telling is that the speaker must have some
credibility in order for the telling to be successful. In the example given
above of the Pope telling his audience that God exists, he is likely to
succeed in persuading the audience of the truth of his statement only if
the audience believes he has the credibility to convey such information-
presumably, such credibility comes with the job title of "Pope," at least
to a certain segment of society. In the case of stating that Milkovich lied,
the question is whether the speaker has the credibility to cause the
audience to believe that Milkovich committed perjury on the stand. In
libel cases, then, libel can be committed only if the speaker is "telling"
the audience a (false) fact and the speaker has sufficient credibility to
cause a reaction in the hearer's mind where he comes to believe the fact
is true. If the speaker lacks credibility-or clearly lacks the knowledge
of the underlying facts-then a hearer cannot reasonably believe that the
speaker can convey any knowledge to him, and thus, there should be no
libel.'60
159. GREEN, supra note 148, at 56 (citing Paul Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV.
377, 382 (1957)).
160. There is a field of philosophy called epistemology that studies how
knowledge is conveyed. There is a sub-field of philosophy that studies the
epistemology of testimony, which examines how one might come to have knowledge
based solely on the statements of others. It is crucial to the conveyance of knowledge
that a speaker both intends to "tell" a fact and has the credibility to do so effectively.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH FRICKER, Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy, in THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY 229 (Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa eds., 2006)
("[T]here must be a proposition which the teller intends by her action to present as
true . . . ."). Although there are certainly disputes among philosophers about what is
required, the main principle is that a speaker cannot convey knowledge that he
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3. Reporting
It is also necessary to distinguish "asserting" from "reporting."
Reporting is a separate, specific kind of speech act. In reporting, one is
not committing to the truth of the proposition reported; one is
committing to the accurate and truthful conveyance of what was said.
Thus, if one states that "John claims" some proposition P, then the
speaker is committing to the truth that John claimed P, but not to the
truth of P.161 Philosophers have no trouble seeing this distinction, but it
has not yet been widely accepted in legal circles. The few jurisdictions
that have adopted neutral reportage or the third-party allegation rule,162
or that have interpreted the substantial truth doctrine broadly, have
implicitly recognized this important distinction between reporting and
asserting, but the failure to adopt such defenses as a matter of
constitutional privilege greatly contributes to the "Sullivan gap."l63
4. Conjecture, Speculation, and Other Speech Acts
Other speech acts such as "conjecture," "speculation,"
"concluding," or "hypothesizing" are distinct from "asserting," and are
generally recognized as such by the courts as protected forms of
speech.164 In most cases, the courts find that these types of speech acts
himself does not have. If we were to carry this notion over to libel law, it would
mean, quite reasonably, that a libel claim cannot be based on a statement made by
someone who clearly lacks the knowledge of underlying facts. See, e.g., the
discussion of Global Relief supra Part III.C.
161. GREEN, supra note 148, at 167.
162. See, e.g., Neely v. Wilson, 331 SW.3d 900, 913 (Tex. App. 2011), reh'g
granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 499 (Tex. June 15, 2012).
163. One of the criticisms of the Sullivan actual malice standard is that the
emphasis on subjective belief of truth or falsity does a disservice to the ethical
mandate among journalists that one strive for truth. See JOHN WATSON, JOURNALISM
ETHICS BY COURT DECREE (Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., 2008). While I concur that such
an ethical aspiration exists, I would argue that it is important to distinguish between
the truth of a proposition and the truth of a report or of a sincere expression of belief.
As noted many times herein, false statements are not always valueless if they point
to some larger truth.
164. See, e.g., Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d 646, 655 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding
that the statement "[m]aybe he planned to run for some sort of political office or was
trying to obtain a politically connected employment opportunity" was non-actionable
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qualify as "opinion," or at least, that they fail to constitute a "factual
assertion." One reason why these forms of speech are generally
protected is that the context of the statement is usually unambiguous with
respect to illocutionary force, or the context makes clear that the speaker
has no special knowledge of facts. Even without expressly adopting a
speech acts model, the courts have implicitly recognized that these kinds
of statements convey expressive value that is worthy of constitutional
protection.
D. Constitutional Protection for Speech Acts
It should be apparent from the foregoing explanation that a
statement should not be evaluated on semantic content alone. A
speaker's sentence should be interpreted based on the illocutionary force
behind it-in other words, depending on what kind of speech act is
performed. For the purposes of libel law, I argue that we should abandon
the false distinction between "factual assertions" and "opinions." These
are not the only two kinds of statements; rather there is a continuum with
a wide range of kinds of speech that straddle the concept of assertion and
belief. There are gradations of assertion, each with its own norms and
levels of responsibility undertaken by the speaker. We should also stop
conflating the truth of a statement with the truth of a proposition.
Instead, we should focus on whether the statements at issue serve some
expressive purpose or are offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Some speech acts serve legitimate expressive purposes.
Reporting, for example, is what the newspaper in Norton was doing
when it informed its readership of Councilman Glenn's absurd
statements. The paper truthfully reported Glenn's statements not to
prove the truth of the proposition (that the mayor was a "queer" or "child
"opinion;" it was obvious that author "wondered" about his motives but did not state
as fact that he was motivated by political concerns); see also Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc.,
241 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[l]f it is plain that the speaker is expressing a
subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than
claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not
actionable.") (citation omitted).
165. See Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004).
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molester"), but to demonstrate Glenn's outlandish behavior.166 Such
reporting has value to the audience, who can reasonably discern that the
proposition is not necessarily true merely because it was said, and can
understand that the existence of the statement demonstrates some larger
truth about the city council meeting.
Expressions of belief should also be protected when the
existence of the belief is an important fact in itself, even if the belief
might not be true. The fact that segments of society believe that
President Obama is a Muslim,167 for example, conveys important
information about the beliefs of American voters, regardless of whether
the President is or is not a Muslim. Protecting expressions of belief
requires an understanding that "assertions" play a dual role, and courts
will have to determine whether the statement is primarily an expression
of belief or whether it rises to the level of "telling."
"Telling" is the one speech act that could legitimately serve as
the basis of a libel claim. If a speaker's primary purpose is to state facts,
to represent them as true, to urge the audience to adopt those facts as true
on the basis of the speaker's statement, the speaker plausibly has the
credibility to know the truth, and is successful in creating the desired
perlocutionary effect in the hearer, then the speaker may be liable if it
turns out that the statement was false (particularly if it were known to be
false). Such a case differs from those where there is some other
expressive purpose worthy of constitutional protection. In a telling, the
speaker presents himself as knowing the information;168 this is
distinguishable from other cases.
While it may be difficult in some cases to discern the speaker's
purpose, courts are equipped to deal with evidence of intent; in fact,
courts have been examining intent since Sullivan, as the actual malice
standard typically requires an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of
the publisher. In many cases, the illocutionary force of a statement is
apparent, if only the courts would consider the range of speech acts and
their purposes, rather than limiting the analysis to the imprecise concept
of "assertions."
166. Id. at 60.
167. See Cohen & Shear, supra note 6, at Al, A4.
168. It would not make sense to impose liability in a case where no knowledge
is conveyed, and knowledge is conveyed only in limited circumstances. See infra
note 170.
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V. ADDRESSING THE TRADITIONAL CONCERNS WITH LIBEL DEFENSES
Opponents of broad libel defenses generally argue that there is a
danger in providing a defense to anyone who repeats a rumor or other
unfounded allegation: the allegation will gain traction and perceived
credibility if its dissemination is protected.' I agree that it does a
disservice to the pursuit of truth to enhance a false allegation's
credibility. But it also does a disservice to the pursuit of truth to punish
discussions of false allegations. The existence of false allegations can be
a legitimate part of the whole truth. Thus, the remedy should not be to
prohibit all mention of false allegations. The remedy should allow for
the acknowledgement of false allegations in a manner that does not
improperly enhance the allegations' credibility. A speech act model
would be ideal because it expressly acknowledges the limits of what can
reasonably be known or conveyed by a statement, and it accommodates
the distinction between the truth of a proposition and the larger truth of
what state of affairs exist in the world.
Another traditional concern is that even if no one in the
immediate audience believes the allegation, it is possible that someone in
a different territory or at a different time will see the allegations and lack
the contextual information to understand that it is unlikely to be true.
However, that also seems like an insufficient justification for imposing
liability because the courts typically provide First Amendment protection
to jokes, even though jokes have been misinterpreted by those not in the
original, intended audience. 7 0
Any potential harm to reputation may derive from a problem
with social convention. As a matter of good reasoning, audiences should
not automatically assume that propositions are true merely because
statements are made. A reader or hearer should bear the obligation of
169. SACK, supra note 25, § 7.1.
170. One of the best known and most humorous examples occurred when
China's Beijing Evening News reprinted a story from the Onion (a satirical
"newspaper") headlined "Congress Threatens To Leave D.C. Unless New Capitol Is
Built." Kathryn S. Wenner, Peeling the Onion, AM. JOURNALISM REV., 49, 53 (Sept.
2002). Apparently, the Onion gets "stacks" of responses from people who
mistakenly interpret their "news reports" as genuine. Id See also Robert Mackey,
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weighing all relevant evidence and withholding judgment until the
weight of evidence indicates that a proposition is true or false. The
republication rule in libel law is based on the opposite premise-that a
person should and will take any proposition at face value.
Such a premise is flawed. Speech always reflects upon the
speaker,17' but it does not always reflect the truth. An assertion may be
made to assert the truth of a proposition, but it is not necessarily so. As
demonstrated by the many cases cited above, speech is not always about
the truth of a proposition. In many cases, speech serves an expressive
purpose aside from the truth of the proposition. The expressive purpose
may be to reflect the speaker's belief, motive, or state of mind; or it may
be to dutifully report the beliefs, motives or state of mind of another or
demonstrate a controversy. While serving truth is a noble goal and
should be encouraged as an ethical and moral matter, we must also
recognize as a practical matter that stating the truth of a proposition is
only one of many purposes for which humans legitimately use speech.
Speech is expressive, and it is this expressive value of speech that the
First Amendment was designed to and should protect.172 Because of that
171. A speaker risks his own reputation when he speaks. Green has written on
the issue of credibility as a handicap to a speaker. He argues that humans value
status, and that credibility is a form of status. See Mitchell S. Green, Speech Acts, the
Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States, 24 MIND &
LANGUAGE 139, 152-54 (2009). Failing to accurately convey information or the
degree of one's commitment to a proposition will harm a speaker's credibility and
therefore acts as a deterrent to abusive speech. See id.
172. Regarding the "value" of speech, it is important to note that speakers and
hearers may value it differently. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Some Comments on
Professor Neuborne's Paper, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 65 (1989-90) (describing speaker-
centered and hearer-centered theories of the First Amendment, and how speakers and
hearers may value speech differently). While I agree that speakers and hearers value
speech differently, I think there is an objective value to speech that is often
overlooked. To a speaker, his speech always has value. Whatever he says, he says
for a reason. His speech is meaningful to him, whether because he believes it to be
true, or is trying to communicate an idea, or is expressing his beliefs, or is otherwise
fulfilling some motive on his part. (The motive may be simple and unrelated to the
content of the speech, such as when someone is engaged with in "small talk" with a
stranger at an event; the speaker may not think that the content of his statement
about the weather or the Red Sox or whatever is of as much value as the mere fact he
has said something, anything, to avoid an awkward silence. The speech's existence
has value to him even if the exact content is less important.). A hearer, however,
tends to value the speaker's speech according to the hearer's own needs. Does it
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principle, we should interpret speech accordingly, to reflect first and
foremost the speaker's expressive purpose.
As a practical matter, humans do interpret speech to reflect upon
the speaker. The principle was noted in a Harvard Law Review
commentary on Norton: "When a politician makes an outlandish
accusation-especially one that is outlandish because it is clearly
defamatory-that accusation is newsworthy because of what it says
about the speaker, not the accused."1 7 3
Academic studies, moreover, have shown that speech reflects on
a speaker in ways that have nothing to do with the truth of the statements
made. One study found that women who gossip at work are viewed as
"less emotionally warm" than others.174 The study did not focus on
convey valuable information? Is it offensive to the hearer's views? Is the speaker
simply too loud or annoying? The hearer might prefer silence to small talk,
explaining the divergent opinions of air travelers over the propriety of speaking to
fellow travelers. Speech, however, has a value to a hearer that is often ignored.
Speech is valuable precisely because of the intrinsic value to the speaker. A
speaker's speech will inform the hearer of something about the speaker; it will
convey the speaker's views, beliefs, or motives. Even if they are unpopular or
unwanted, the fact of their existence may nevertheless be conveyed. That
information is useful in itself because it allows the hearer to better understand the
speaker. Interpersonal understanding is generally undervalued as an important aspect
of speech in First Amendment theory or doctrine. Theorists tend to place more
emphasis on democratic self-governance or the quest for truth. See, e.g., Robert Post,
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 2353 (2000). 1 would argue, however, that neither of these goals is achievable
without interpersonal understanding. Our ability to function collectively and self-
govern as a nation requires an understanding of the needs, interests, opinions, and
perspectives of our fellow citizens. Our ability to seek truth requires an
understanding of how others view the world. Thus, understanding the speaker's
view, belief or motive is of value to a hearer, even if there is no other obvious
informational or emotional interest in the speech.
173. Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Freedom of the Press-Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Declines to Adopt Neutral Reportage Privilege-Norton v. Glenn,
860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2034 (2004-05) (emphasis
added). See also Dworkin v. L.F.P, Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 916 (Wyo. 1992) ("Vulgar
speech reflects more on the character of the user of such language than on the object
of such language.") (citing Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th
Cir. 1966)).
174. Sally D. Farley, Diane R. Timme & Jason W. Hart, On Coffee Talk and
Break-Room Chatter: Perceptions of Women Who Gossip in the Workplace, 150 J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 361, 361 (June 2010).
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whether hearers believed the gossip, but concluded that the act of
gossiping reflected on the speaker. Another study found that speakers
who argue "aggressively" are viewed as less credible and have fewer
valid arguments credited to them, aside from the content of the
arguments.175  Such findings support the claim that hearers learn
something about the speaker aside from learning anything about the truth
or falsity of a statement; thus, one risks one's own reputation when
speaking, which should act as a deterrent to the gratuitous spread of false
information. 7 6
Humans do understand the different contexts in which statements
are presented and the importance of the credibility or standing of the
speaker. And yet libel doctrine currently lacks such nuance. What is
needed is a recognition by the Supreme Court that statements must be
evaluated carefully to determine if they deserve constitutional protection.
Such a normative standard is best promoted by strong First Amendment
protection of speech based on the philosophy that (1) the truth of a
statement is not necessarily the same as the truth of the proposition
contained therein, (2) statements should not be presumed to reflect the
truth of a proposition absent indicia of intent to "tell" the truth, and (3)
statements are primarily expressive and reflect first and foremost on the
speaker.
VI. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
There are a variety of measures courts could take to minimize
the "Sullivan gap" and clarify the nature of statements that would be
constitutionally protected for their expressive value. There are several
good policy reasons for the courts to adopt one or more of these
measures.
A. Possible Defenses or Privileges
Many commentators have urged the courts to adopt a neutral
reportage defense, or a close variation thereof, as a matter of
175. Dominic A. Infante et al., Initiating and reciprocating verbal aggression:
Effects on credibility and credited valid arguments, 43 COMM. STUDIES 182 (1992).
176. See also GREEN, supra note 148.
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constitutional privilege. 177 Such a defense would be helpful in protecting
"reporting" as a speech act, although it is not clear that such a defense
would always be helpful. One ambiguity is whether the charges reported
must come from a credible or reputable source.17 8  While Edwards
applied the neutral reportage doctrine to public figures, protection may
not be extended to reports about private figures.
Alternately, courts might adopt the Illinois/Seventh Circuit
interpretation of the substantial truth doctrine or the Texan variant, the
"third-party allegation rule."179 This, too, would protect the speech act of
"reporting," although there is a question about whether this defense
would be available only to the "media" and how "media" would be
defined.
Adopting defenses that protect "reporting," moreover, would not
solve the problem of distinguishing factual assertions from opinions. To
have a consistent principle applied in libel cases would require courts to
acknowledge the different uses of assertions, and to distinguish
expressions of belief from "telling." Thus, I would argue that it is time
to make a fundamental change to the analysis in libel cases.
The Supreme Court should establish a comprehensive test that
accounts for the wide range of speech acts, eliminates the "Sullivan gap,"
and acknowledges the importance of providing constitutional protection
to statements with an expressive purpose by adding a step to the
constitutional scrutiny applied in libel cases. The Court should rule that
a court must first inquire into the expressive value of the statement and
ask whether the statement was offered to prove the truth of the
proposition or whether it was offered for some expressive purpose, such
as to explain events, demonstrate a conflict, reflect the speaker's belief or
state of mind, or convey the fact that that statement was made apart from
endorsing of the truth of the underlying propositional content. In other
177. See Donnellan & Peacock, supra note 63, at 241-42, 268; Donnelly,
supra note 63; see also Scott E. Saef, Comment, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a
Statutory Privilege, 86 N.w. U. L. REV. 417 (1992) (arguing for a statutory
privilege).
178. See supra note 61; see also Keith C. Buell, Note, "Start Spreading the
News": Why Republishing Material from "Disreputable" News Reports Must be
Constitutionally Protected, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 966, 969-70 (2000).
179. See Neely v. Wilson, 331 S.W.3d 900, 913 (Tex. App. 2011), reh'g
granted, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 499 (Tex. June 15, 2012).
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words, a court should determine the nature of the speech act made by the
speaker.180 A libel claim should be permitted only in cases where the
statement is made primarily to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e.,
where the speaker is telling rather than reporting, conjecturing, asserting
a belief, or engaging in other forms of expressive activity. No libel
claims would be permitted where the statement is most reasonably
construed as having an expressive purpose other than proving the truth
of the matter asserted, primarily conveying expressive value apart from
the truth of the underlying propositional content.182 Once this initial
inquiry is made, a court would proceed with its common law analysis
and applying the Sullivan or Gertz standards of fault where
appropriate.
Such a test would not completely gut the common law
republication rule. In cases where the republisher intends to persuade the
audience that it should adopt a proposition as true, the republisher would
be as equally liable for false, defamatory content as the original speaker.
But in cases where the republisher's goal is to draw attention to a
viewpoint or point to a broader truth and does not necessarily adopt the
truth of the underlying propositional content, the republisher would be
180. This inquiry would, ideally, be a threshold issue of law for a court to
decide.
181. To have a libel claim, the following requirements should be met: the
speaker must be "telling" (i.e., the speaker's primary purpose must be to state facts,
represent them as true and urge the audience to adopt those facts as true on the basis
of the speaker's statement), the speaker must have credibility (meaning it is
reasonable to believe the speaker knows the truth), and the speaker must be
successful in creating the desired perlocutionary effect in the hearer. All three
components should be required to create the act of "libeling."
182. In addition to the positive expressive purposes listed, it is entirely
possible that a speaker's expressive purpose is to be cruel, demeaning, insulting, or
otherwise offensive. Such purposes, while not endorsed, are nevertheless legitimate
expressive purposes and should be protected by the First Amendment. The penalty in
such cases is the negative light into which the speaker will be cast by virtue of his
apparent motives. Such statements still convey valuable information about the
speaker, even if they do not reflect any truth about the subject.
183. The test proposed herein would protect knowingly false statements of fact
only in cases where there is some expressive value, such as in Hustler or Norton. See
supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text. It would not protect knowing falsities
that people try to "tell" others, which is what libel law should truly be targeting.
Such a standard would eliminate the "Sullivan gap."
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immune from liability. In such cases, a plaintiff would still have
recourse against the originator of the libelous statement, if otherwise
permitted by libel law and the Sullivan or Gertz standards.
What this adds up to is a rethinking of what it means to
"publish" a "factual assertion" for the purposes of libel law. Common
law principles require the plaintiff to prove that a defamatory "factual
assertion" was "published.'184 The Supreme Court should acknowledge
the importance of providing constitutional protection to statements with
an expressive purpose by narrowing the field of "factual assertions."
Such a test would incorporate the concerns intermittently
addressed by courts that have applied the fair report privilege, neutral
reportage privilege, opinion privilege, substantial truth doctrine, or third-
party allegation rule in an effort to accommodate protection of statements
that express some larger truth even where the truth of the underlying
propositional content is suspect. It would also alleviate the hypocrisy of
Hustler to acknowledge that there are a wide range of statements that
superficially appear to be assertions, and yet, upon closer inspection,
cannot reasonably be construed to state actual facts. A comprehensive
test of this nature would override the need for the varied tests that have
been applied over time and across jurisdictions, and provide consistency
and clarity for speakers and subjects alike.
A constitutional privilege distinguishing a statement made for an
expressive purpose from a statement made to prove the truth of the
proposition would not be a huge logical leap for the justice system. U.S.
courts have made the distinction between the truth of a proposition and
broader truth when considering the admissibility of evidence, specifically
with respect to hearsay. Courts ask whether a statement is made to prove
the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., whether the proposition is true) or
whether the statement is made to demonstrate some other point (i.e.,
whether the statement, true or false, illustrates some broader truth about
the speaker's or hearer's mindset or beliefs).186 This distinction is made
because if the statement is offered to prove the truth of the proposition,
then the courts demand that the speaker testify in court so that he may be
184. See generally Bernard S. Jefferson, The Hearsay Rule - Determining
When Evidence is Hearsay or Nonhearsay and Determining its Relevance as One or
the Other, 30 UWLA L. REv. 135 (1999).
185. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
186. See Jefferson, supra note 184.
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cross-examined and his credibility tested."" If the statement is offered
for some other purpose, then the speaker's presence is less important, as
the truth of the statement is secondary to the other expressive purpose.
Thus, courts already recognize that statements can be used for a purpose
other than conveying the truth of a proposition, and that those other
purposes are legitimate and worthy of consideration.' The same
reasoning should apply in libel cases. If a statement is made for an
expressive purpose, the emphasis should be placed on the speaker's
expression and be given First Amendment protection. A person's
statement should not be taken as an assertion of truth in all
circumstances, as it may be offered for another purpose. When it is
offered to prove the truth of the proposition asserted, then the speaker is
subject to examination and to having his credibility tested.
Moreover, such an analysis would be akin to the analysis used in
cases involving threats: courts must distinguish between true threats (i.e.,
where the threat is made to prove the truth of the matter asserted-that
the speaker intends to carry out the threat) and statements that could be
interpreted as threats on the face of the statement, but are offered for
some expressive purpose, not to indicate an actual threat of harm.8
Courts evaluate tone, context, and convention to determine the purpose
for which the statement is made. It may therefore be appropriate for the
courts to consider the expressive purpose of an "assertion" in libel cases
as well.
187. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 245-46 (5th ed.
1999).
188. See supra Part III.
189. Compare Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)
(ruling statement by Vietnam War protester was political hyperbole and not a true
threat), with United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
that abortion protester made "true threats" to abortion doctor when she told abortion
doctor "[t]his [murder] could happen to you . . . " and noted her approval of killing
abortion doctors). The fact that an expressive use test is applied does not necessarily
mean the determinations are easy. See Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (noting varying decisions about whether an anti-abortion website
constituted a "true threat"). Nevertheless, courts are equipped to make such
determinations. What is important, from a First Amendment standpoint, is that the
test used by the courts accounts for legitimate expressive value and does not focus
solely on the semantic content of the statement.
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B. Presumptions and Burdens
An unanswered question remains: even if the Court were to rule
that courts should differentiate among speech acts in libel cases, what
burden of proof would be required to determine which kind of speech act
is made?
It may be difficult in many cases to determine whether a
statement is meant as a report, an assertion, or as a telling. Law often
sorts out difficult questions with presumptions and burdens: from which
presumption do we begin, and who has the burden of proof to persuade
us otherwise? The courts could begin with the presumption that a
statement is a "telling" unless the defendant can show otherwise, but
such a presumption would be inconsistent with the general tendency to
protect expressive value when First Amendment interests are at stake.
Alternatively, the courts could choose not to presume anything about the
statement and examine the context, tone, and other indicators to see
whether the intent of the speaker is clear. However, there will certainly
be cases where the statement seems ambiguous and it will be necessary
to choose one interpretation or another. Thus, the courts should
establish, as a matter of constitutional principle, the presumption that a
statement is offered for an expressive purpose rather than to prove the
truth of the propositional content of the statement, unless there is some
evidence to indicate otherwise. Some conventions might always lead the
audience and the courts to presume that the statements at issue are not
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. For example, news
reporting may be presumed to be a "report" rather than a "telling" or an
"assertion."l90 Opinion columns may be presumed to be expressions of
belief, rather than fact. Since it is notoriously difficult to distinguish
between speech acts, and because most speakers' primary purpose is to
express belief, opinions, state of mind, or experience, such a presumption
would best secure First Amendment protection for expressive
statements. 191
190. See GREEN, supra note 148, at 167 (explaining that reporting is not a
commitment to the truth of a proposition, but rather to the truth of describing what
was said).
191. Nat Stem has argued that courts have implicitly considered a spectrum of
epistemic certainty in First Amendment cases: they tend to allow more regulation of
speech in areas where there is ample evidence to adduce the truth of a proposition,
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It is particularly important to protect the expression of belief,
even if it must come across in the form of an "assertion." Belief has "no
facial, or any other behavioral, signature: there is no characteristic way
that a person looks or otherwise behaves when she believes
something."192 Because humans have no other way to convey their
beliefs, their internal states or mindsets without making statements that
might look on the surface like "assertions," the courts must leave
breathing room for such expression.
Unfortunately, there is also no accepted indicator in our culture
to discern when someone is making an assertion to acknowledge the
truth of the proposition asserted. Gottlob Frege, a German
mathematician and philosopher, proposed a logically correct language
193
that included an "assertion sign," which was used for this purpose.
The closest sign we have in contemporary language are parentheticals,
such as "I think," "I believe," or "I suppose," to indicate the level of
commitment one is making to a proposition. 194 It would be incredibly
burdensome, however, to require speakers to always include a
parenthetical in every expression.195  It would hinder creativity and
but tend to provide greater protection to speech where the government lacks the
knowledge or experience to claim itself as the undisputed arbiter of truth. Stem,
supra note 126, at 607-12. "Whatever formal 'test' courts have ultimately adopted,
epistemologically the crucial point is that the majority approach has generally been
undergirded by an attitude of extreme skepticism and humility that errs on the side of
finding nonactionability." Id. at 611. The notion of "humility" is crucial to First
Amendment protection. It is imperative for speakers and audiences alike to
distinguish between one's own beliefs and or opinions, and matters of established
fact. Although one may believe a particular assertion with all one's heart, the
assertion may not, in fact, be true. The discernment of truth can be difficult,
particularly in light of the fact that human expression is diverse and complex, where
words may have multiple meanings, and context can change the interpretation of a
statement in its entirety. It is therefore important to maximize protection for the
expressive value of speech and err on the side of non-actionability.
192. GREEN, supra note 148, at 92.
193. See id. at 99, 150.
194. Id. at 150.
195. Nor is it clear that such a requirement would immunize a defendant from
liability under current law; in Milkovich, the Court specifically rejected the notion
that the parenthetical "in my opinion" would adequately modify an assertion.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990). Absent the kind of
expressive use test proposed herein, citizens cannot be sure that the expression of
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require a level of literalness that is not conducive to expressing the range
of human experience. It makes more sense to look to context, as courts
do, to determine the intent of the speaker. And although it would
"behoove speakers to employ a force-elucidating device whose own
illocutionary status is not itself up for question,"l96 it certainly should not
be a legal requirement.' On the contrary, we should presume a
statement to be expressive, and therefore protected speech, unless the
evidence shows otherwise.
Another option would be to impose a procedural requirement on
libel plaintiffs: a plaintiff must demand a clarification of intent from the
speaker before filing any action. As Green noted, it is acceptable, and
sometimes necessary, to ask what a person means (what speech act is
being performed) when meaning is ambiguous.19 It is therefore fair to
require an aggrieved person to ask the speaker what he intends to convey
by his statement and give the potential defendant an opportunity to
clarify what he intended to convey. No claim should be permitted if a
plaintiff fails to request a clarification or if the statement is clarified to
convey some form of protected speech.' 99 However, a defendant who
their beliefs or state of mind will be protected speech, even if they attempt to modify
the context of their statements with an appropriate parenthetical.
196. GREEN, supra note 148, at 162.
197. Even Green admits that "[i]t is not clear that there are, or even could be,
any strong [illocutionary force indicators] in an actual or possible language." Id. at
163. While there may be "weak" indicators, see id at 165-70, we should also
appreciate the wide range of ways humans can express themselves. "We thus cannot
infer, from the premise that an expression has semantic content, to the conclusion
that it can't also be a device of self-expression." Id. at 170. Moreover, the remedy is
the loss of credibility that accrues when a speaker fails to properly convey his intent
and level of commitment to a statement. See id
198. See GREEN, supra note 148.
199. An example of how this might work is illustrated by Dan Snyder's
lawsuit against the Washington City Paper, arising from an article titled The Cranky
Redskins Fan's Guide to Dan Snyder. Dave McKenna, The Cranky Redskins Fan's
Guide to Dan Snyder, WASH. CITY PAPER, Nov. 19, 2010. The story was a sarcastic
look at the ways in which Snyder alienated football fans in the D.C. area; some of
the statements were false (and knowingly false) if read literally, but the statements
were intended to be hyperbolic. See id. Although many readers may have found the
article to be a hilarious and accurate portrayal of why Snyder is not beloved by
Redskins fans (for example, a popular bumper sticker in the DC area says, "Impeach
Snyder"), Snyder did not find the article to be funny. Snyder sued the paper based on
certain statements in the story, but later withdrew his lawsuit. A statement by
refuses to clarify his intent might be subject to a stricter burden (for
example, a court might presume the statement was a "telling," and place
the burden on the defendant to prove otherwise).
CONCLUSION
Sullivan was a watershed case that has served important First
Amendment interests. However, time has shown that there is a "Sullivan
gap," a lack of legal protection for socially important speech that falls
outside the scope of the limited protection Sullivan offers. Moreover, the
courts have struggled with ways to protect expressive speech in a variety
of contexts, using a mishmash of defenses in an effort to preserve
expressive freedom for "assertions." The problem is not one of
principle, but of terminology and approach.
Borrowing the concept of a "speech act" goes a long way
towards clarifying what kinds of statements should be protected because
of their strong expressive value. Establishing such protection as a matter
of constitutional principle would eliminate the uncertainty faced by
national publishers who risk liability because of variations among state
laws. When publishers determine in good faith that a statement is
newsworthy and contains expressive value and is likely to be protected,
Snyder's spokesperson said that the lawsuit was withdrawn because "the
[Washington City Paper] and its writer have admitted that certain assertions
contained in the article that are the subject of the lawsuit, were, in fact, unintended
by the defendants to be read literally as true. Therefore, we see nothing further to be
gained at this time through continuing the lawsuit." Erik Wemple, Why did Dan
Snyder want to sue Washington City Paper?, WASH. POST OPINIONS BLOG (Sept. 13,
2011), http://washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple. Although it can be argued that
Snyder should never have filed the lawsuit in the first place, his stated reason for
withdrawing the suit is consistent with my argument. Assuming he truly believed
that the illocutionary force of the statement was in question, it was appropriate for
him to demand that the paper/writer clarify it. Did the defendants mean a statement
to be read literally or as a joke? Once the speaker's intent is clarified, there should be
no libel claim if the statement is not intended to tell the audience anything; and the
speech should be constitutionally protected if it has some useful expressive value,
such as jokingly conveying why Snyder is an unpopular owner. The clarification in
Snyder's case rendered the libel claim moot because, once the clarification was
made, the statement certainly could not be reasonably understood as conveying
actual facts, and the audience could not reasonably have the perlocutionary effect of
being persuaded to believe a false fact.
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reasoning that the allegation is important because it was made without
regard to the truth of proposition, they should not face liability merely
because the plaintiff chooses to sue in a jurisdiction that happens to
reject-or more strictly define-defenses that are available in other
jurisdictions. The expressive value-and the constitutional value-of
such statements does not vary across jurisdictions even if the law does.
Such an analysis would greatly simplify libel doctrine. Myriad
defenses have arisen because of the lack of clarity in the way speech is
used. Courts have intuitively recognized the concepts presented herein-
for example, that some statements are simply not understood as
representing actual facts even if the semantic content of the sentence
superficially appears to be an "assertion," or that conclusions and
speculation are different from "telling," or that expressions of belief
should be protected even if they have no way of presenting themselves
but through a statement-but there has been no unifying idea explaining
why some statements are protected and others are not. This Article, at its
heart, presents a unifying concept that should eliminate confusion and
streamline the analysis in libel cases.
This new approach would be more consistent with other aspects
of First Amendment doctrine. Typically, restrictions on content-based
speech are subject to strict scrutiny; there must be a compelling
government interest in restricting the speech, and the restriction must be
narrowly tailored so as to not restrict more speech than necessary to
protect that interest.200 Libel law serves as a restriction on content-based
speech, and yet the courts have struggled to create tailored doctrines that
permit liability only where there is a compelling interest. The
government arguably has a compelling interest in preventing fraud and
intentional deception, two types of knowing falsities. But the "actual
malice" rule is not narrowly tailored because it captures speech that has
expressive value and is neither calculated nor likely to perpetuate a false
belief, as illustrated by Norton. The larger question is whether the
government has a compelling interest in defending the reputation of
200. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near, the Court
struck down a state law that regulated "scandalous newspapers" as nuisances. Id. at
722-23. Prosecutors attempted to enjoin publication of The Saturday Press as a
nuisance because of its anti-Semitic content. Id. at 706.
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individuals.201 But even if one were to answer that in the affirmative,
Sullivan makes clear that reputational interests must yield to the First
202
Amendment when legitimate First Amendment interests are present.
Any interest in protecting reputation must be approached in a limited
manner so that speech with expressive value is not encompassed within
the restrictions. Requiring the courts to first determine whether there is
expressive value in the statement would limit libel suits only to those
cases where there is a compelling interest in preventing the harm caused
by "telling," and would serve the long-recognized purpose of the First
Amendment in protecting socially valuable expression.
201. Reputation has proved to be a complex topic with practical realities that
have changed over time. There are now reputation management services that can
promote "positive" views of a person and attempt to "hide" negative news online.
Furthermore, as a cultural matter, there are rarely negative consequences to those
with poor reputations. Bad behavior is now rewarded with reality television shows,
money, invitations to high profile events, and fame and its attendant benefits.
Moreover, reputation is no longer static. Scandal-plagued celebrities like Michael
Milken or Hugh Grant have successfully rehabilitated their images, lessening any
"harm" from negative assertions about them. Given the lack of social strictures and
the private mechanisms available for protecting reputation, it is fair to ask whether or
not there is a compelling interest in using government resources to "protect"
reputation. This question is aside from the question of whether reputation is an
objective thing that can be controlled and protected or whether it consists solely of
subjective interpretations that are not subject to external control. See GERALD FERRIS
ET AL., Personal Reputation in Organizations, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: THE
STATE OF THE SCIENCE 215 (Jerald Greenberg, ed., 2003) (noting observations on
reputations: that they are perceptual in nature, they can be influenced by deliberate
or chance events, they are sometimes manageable and sometimes unmanageable, and
they are the result of continuous processes).
202. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964). As promised, I
return to principle (1) discussed in Section 1. The analysis proposed herein would
also be consistent with the statement in Sullivan that constitutional protection does
not depend on truth. Id. at 271-72. Constitutional protection should depend on
expressive purpose.
